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“Someone to face the day with, make it through all the rest with  
Someone I'll always laugh with, even at my worst I'm best with you  
It's like you're always stuck in second gear 
When it hasn't been your day, your week, your month, or even your year” 
 
To my beloved friends Chiara, Giulia and Marika   
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Introduction 
 
What is political risk (PR), and what is the best way to assess it? Although risk 
calculation has always been part of any business venture, it was only after the Second 
World War, especially in relation with the relevant outflow of capital from the US to 
Europe, that political risk analysis began to be developed as such. The concept of 
political risk was introduced as a component of country risk, in order to account for the 
causes of the insolvency of a country, not directly linked to financial/economic factors. 
Political risk gained more and more relevance in the following decades, as 
several institutions started to develop specific methodologies to evaluate it, trying to 
keep pace with the fast-changing dynamics of the internationalisation of trade and 
investment. 
According to the World Investment Report 2012, although the current 
perspectives of transnational investment remain fraught with risks deriving from 
multiple sources, global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows exceeded the pre-crisis 
average in 2011, reaching $1,5 trillion, with greenfield investments accounting for 
almost two-thirds total FDI
1
. Even more than portfolio investment, FDI – especially 
when taking the form of greenfield investment – entails a careful consideration of the 
possible political scenarios in the host country: it therefore comes as no surprise if in 
recent years political risk analysis has come to the fore as an essential tool for executive 
decision-making, regardless of the dimensions of the business. In addition, a plethora of 
other actors perform political risk analysis for investment-related purposes, from 
consulting firms to export credit agencies, from rating agencies to insurance companies. 
                                                          
1
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2012 
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Diversity in the nature of the actors performing political risk analysis is matched by the 
many diverse meanings attached to this catch-all term. 
Partly due to its intrinsically interdisciplinary nature, political risk as such has 
been neglected as a subject of study in the context of academic political science, despite 
the tradition of studies on the variously defined concept of “political instability”. When 
information on political risk is gathered, elaborated and provided to multinational 
investors in the context of political insurance industry, comparisons between the 
different political risk assessment approaches and relative indices are not easy to carry 
out, for evident reasons of competition. This explains the lack of transparency in the 
field, which prompts to question the logic and practice underpinning the existing 
political risk indices. It must be acknowledged that, for example, despite some 
interesting contributions in the last years (see in particular Jensen, 2003 and 2008) the 
relationship between political regimes proper and political risk remains largely 
unexplored. Therefore, a reappraisal of political risk conceptualization and 
measurement seems timely today. 
In light of the above, the present work aims at addressing some open questions. 
What is political risk? Is there a way to get rid of confusion when it comes to its 
conceptualization? Assuming that, as it is often repeated in the literature, the results of 
the extant approaches to PR assessment are not satisfactory, is it possible to highlight 
some specific shortcomings thereof and to provide insights on how to improve them? 
How to combine theoretical soundness and pragmatism to build a macro – political risk 
index? And, finally, what is the role of human judgement in the production of PR data? 
The first chapter of the thesis provides a state of the art of the discipline, 
highlighting the different meanings and relevance that political risk analysis assumes 
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nowadays with respect to different typologies of investors, and anticipating the main 
issues that will be explored in the following chapters.  
The second chapter deals with the theoretical background of PR measurement, 
trying to unpack the causal assumptions that are inevitably embedded in PR indices and 
looking at the Middle-East and North-Africa countries in the years 2010-12 as a case 
study to expose the shortcomings of three different approaches to PR measurement. 
Particular attention is dedicated to the relationship between PR and a country’s political 
regime.  
The third chapter is devoted to concept building and operationalization, and 
proposes a definition of PR which is subsequently operationalized and compared to two 
of the indices presented in the second chapter. The fourth and last chapter closes the 
loop by addressing a problem which is somewhat distinct from PR modelling, yet cross-
cutting and crucial for any PR measurement endeavour : the role, limitations and 
potentialities of human and expert judgement. 
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Chapter 1 
Concepts, Definitions, Challenges  
 
 
 
There is nothing worse than a sharp image of a fuzzy concept. 
(A. Adams) 
 
I. A fuzzy concept  
 
Although risk assessment in terms of political environment has always been part 
of any business venture
2
, the reception of political risk in economic and financial 
literature only dates back to the 1960s. The conceptual boundaries of political risk have 
always been hazy, as testified by the fact that starting from the 1970s, the scholarship on 
political risk features many literature reviews trying to grab hold of this ambiguous 
concept (e.g. Kobrin 1978, Fitzpatrick 1983, Simon 1984, Friedman 1988, Chermack 
1992, Jarvis 2008). Yet, as a first step in trying to achieve more clarity in this field, it is 
possible – and useful to the purposes of this research – to analyse the use of the term in 
its historical evolution.  
In 1960s, when financial and economic actors began to develop country risk 
analysis, the political scenario worldwide was shaped by two complex and intertwining 
processes: the Cold War, with the ideological contrast between capitalism and socialism, 
i.e. free market and planned economies, and the beginning of decolonization. The 
likelihood of events – such as the 1956 Suez crisis or the 1960 Congolese one – that 
                                                          
2
For an historical account of country risk in the late19
th
 -early 20
th
 century, see Ferguson  and Schularick, 
( 2004). 
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could suddenly and drastically change the political as well as the business environment 
increased. Political risk, however, sometimes also referred to as “non-economic risk”3, 
was predominantly considered to be a feature of “underdeveloped” or “modernizing” 
countries (Zink 1973, Green 1974, Green and Korth 1974): as Jodice put it, first 
generation political risk analysts were mostly concerned about investment disputes 
deriving from the so-called “economic nationalism”, i.e. the trend, typical of developing 
countries, to confiscate or expropriate foreign property in the name of public interest 
(Jodice 1985: 9).  
The 1970s were marked by two events, both – unsurprisingly – with a relevant 
impact on the perception of political risk by the business world: the 1973 oil-shock and 
the 1979 Iranian revolution. The occurrence of such grand scale events highlighted the 
importance of political risk assessment and management, and the political risk industry 
began to flourish, with the proliferation of consulting firms as well as of applications for 
political risk coverage, provided both by public and private insurers (Simon 1984). 
The 1980s saw another shift in the connotation of political risk, with a focus on 
the problem of debt management by host countries
4.
 During the 1990s, instead, and even 
more so after the attacks to the World Trade Center in New York City, terrorism has 
become a source of concern of international investors, and has entered the scene as a 
form of political risk (Berry 2010). The scope and breadth of political risk analysis has 
also evolved in geopolitical terms – from the observer's standpoint – from being mostly 
performed by and in the interest of western (mostly American) MNEs, to being a truly 
global activity. Emerging markets firms invest in risky markets more than their global 
counterparts (Satyanand 2011), and in light of the financial (and political-economic) 
                                                          
3
See for instance Mayer (1985: 10). The author surveys the (more or less) structured systems used by 
banks and other entities to assess country risk (and political risk as a part of it) 
4
See for instance Pitch and Steuven (1991) 
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crisis started in 2008, developed countries do not look as rid of risk for foreign investors 
as in the past. Thus, political risk is not any more seen as an exclusive attribute of “least 
developed countries” ( LDCs). 
Generally speaking, it can be said that the term political risk has come to 
designate a component of country risk, the latter being defined as “the ability and 
willingness of a country to service its financial obligations” (Hoti and McAleer 2003:1). 
However, it should also be noted that “country risk” today commonly refers to a wider 
array of risks, not only of financial but also operational in nature : “country risk is of a 
larger scale, incorporating economic and financial characteristics of the system, along 
with the political and social, in the same effort to forecast situations in which foreign 
investors will find problems in specific national environments” (Howell 2007:7). 
 
II. Definitions: a review 
 
In an attempt to classify the alternative “technical” meanings that have been 
attached to political risk over time, the following definitions were identified: 1) political 
risk as non-economic risk (Meyer 1985, Ciarrapico 1984); 2) political risk as unwanted 
government interference with business operations (Eiteman and Stonehill 1973, Aliber 
1975, Henisz and Zelner 2010); 3) political risk as the probability of disruption of the 
operations of MNEs by political forces or events (Root 1972, Brewers 1981, Jodice 
1984, MIGA 2010); 4) political risk as discountinuities in the business environment 
deriving from political change, which have the potential to affect the profits or the 
objectives of a firm (Robock 1971, Thunell 1977, Micallef 1982); 5) political risk 
substantially equated to political instability and radical political change in the host 
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country (Green 1974, Thunell 1975). 
The first definition is typical of an initial phase in which firms and banks began 
to address the problem of assessing risks that could not be classified as mere business 
risks, nor could be evaluated by looking at the economic fundamentals of a country. 
The second definition is quite restrictive, and it has relevant normative 
implications, as noted by Kobrin (1979), because it assumes that government 
intervention is necessarily harmful, i.e. that host government restrictions on FDI 
involves economic inefficiency. This is not always true, and in political risk assessment 
the (not necessarily) diverging objectives of companies and host governments should be 
analyzed as such, in order not to be mislead by preconceptions. It could be added that, 
in light of the debacle of the “Washington consensus” and also considering the financial 
and economic crisis started in 2008 (which exposed the risks implicit in the under-
regulation of markets), the concept of government laissez-faire has lost much of its 
appeal to business theory and practice. 
The third definition is perhaps the most precise from the semantic point of view, 
because it correctly does not consider political risk in terms of events, but rather in 
terms of probability of events (harmful to MNEs operations). If the aspect of probability 
calculation is overlooked, by conceptualizing political risk in terms of mere “events”6 
which can have an impact on the firm, one might end up behaving like the proverbial 
fool that when a man points at the moon, only looks at his finger. Political risk 
calculation is an intrinsically forward-looking task, and political risk may well be 
structurally high, and be perceived as such by a firm, even in the current absence of 
possibly harmful events. 
                                                          
5
Thunell endorses Robock's definition of political risk but in his study he conceptualizes political risk in 
terms of political instability, operationalized in various ways. 
6
See for instance Ekpenyong and Umoren (2010: 28), who define political risk as “any politically induced 
event that has destabilizing effects on the polity, and distorts the functionality of an enterprise.” 
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The fourth category of definitions is broader, since it focuses on the “business 
environment” rather than on the individual firm. The influential definition by Robock 
(1971:7) deserves a closer look: “Political risk in international business exists (1) when 
discontinuities occur in the business environment, (2) when they are difficult to 
anticipate (3) when they result from political change. To constitute a risk these changes 
in the business environment must have a potential for significantly affecting the profit 
or other goals of a particular enterprise”. 
The idea of an existing, observable discontinuity in the business environment is 
quite common in definitions of political risk. Once again, it is important to underscore a 
point: even situations which apparently look stable (and that have been so for a 
relatively long time) may be extremely risky. The notion of latent variable in statistics 
effectively illustrates this concept 
7
. Risk can be thought of as the likelihood of a certain 
event to take place. What is subsequently observed is, in fact, a binary outcome: either 
the event takes place, or it does not. The idea of latent variable is that there is an 
underlying propensity for the event (say, a general strike, a revolution or a mere act of 
expropriation) to occur, that generates it. The political scenario in a country may look 
stable because it actually is stable, or, paradoxically, it can look stable in a given 
moment notwithstanding the fact that the political regime in force is about to collapse. 
In the wake of the Iranian revolution and of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for 
instance, Brewers rightly pointed out that “the past stability of an authoritarian regime 
should not be taken as a predictor of future stability” (Brewers 1981:8). This lesson has 
proved valid also for the Middle-East and North-Africa (MENA) countries which 
experienced drastic political change in the form of revolution in early 2011. 
Robock also introduced a distinction that is particularly salient to this analysis, 
                                                          
7
A very clear statistical treatment of the subject can be found in Scott Long (1997) 
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i.e., the distinction between “macro” political risk (when political changes are directed 
to all foreign enterprise) and “micro” political risk (when changes are selectively 
directed towards specific fields of business activity). Evidently, micro political risk 
assessment should be performed at the industry – or even at the firm – level, while, as 
emerging from the present analysis, when they write about “political risk” in general, 
most authors refer to macro political risk.  
The fifth group of definitions was basically developed by authors who aimed at 
bridging the gap between political science and business studies, building on the 
scholarship on political change. Green's contribution was the first to focus on the 
relationship between the type of political regime and political risk (Green 1972 and 
1974). Seven types of regime are individuated, with a growing level of risk (Figure 1.1): 
Instrumental Adaptive (e.g. US, UK) and Instrumental Non-adaptive (e.g. France, Italy), 
which are labeled as “modernized nation-states”; Quasi-Instrumental (e.g. India, 
Turkey) , Modernizing Autocracies (e.g. Syria, Jordan), Military Dictatorships (e.g. 
Burma, Lybia), Mobilization Systems (e.g. China, Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea) and 
Newly Independent (e.g. Indonesia, Ghana), which are defined as “modernizing nation-
states” . 
Green's approach rests on a number of assumptions. The first is that radical 
political change is intrinsically detrimental to the activity of MNEs. The second is that 
the younger the political system, the less it is “adaptive” to change, and thus the higher 
the risk of radical political change. The third is that economic modernization inevitably 
puts the political system under stress, and that the political institutions in modernizing 
states must either change or be replaced. Although, as already pointed out, it 
interestingly focuses on the origins of political risk in terms of political regime 
structures, this analysis has little empirical foundations and does not delve into the 
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specific mechanisms linking the different kinds of political regimes and political risk. 
Before concluding this section, it is worth adding a few remarks. Today more 
than in the past, the task of political risk conceptualization and assessment is performed 
by private or public agencies (Business Environment Risk Intelligence, Control Risks, 
Eurasia Group, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency in the World Bank 
Group, Oxford Analytica, Political Risk Services Group, to name only some of them). 
As a matter of fact, most of them do not disclose, if not to a very limited extent, their 
methodology for risk-assessment, nor they seem to agree on a precise definition of what 
a political risk is to the purposes of their activities. 
 
Figure 1.1: Governmental Forms and Risk of Radical Political Change  
 
Modernized Nation-States Modernizing Nation-States 
Instrumental 
Adaptive   
Instrumental 
Non-adaptive 
Quasi-
Instrumental 
Modernizing 
Autocracies 
Military 
Dictatorships 
Mobilization 
Systems 
Newly 
Independent 
                           Increasing Risk of Radical Political Change 
 
Source: Green (1974) 
 
This aspect is particularly relevant because the lack of transparency in 
definitions and criteria for measurement is one of the reasons why the realm of political 
risk assessment is often dismissed as a “soft science”. 
It is possible to draw some provisional conclusions from what said so far. First, 
that despite several decades of scholarly endeavours, political risk in international 
business and in political science seems to be affected by conceptual confusion. Second, 
that in light of the renewed interest of scholars and practitioners in the subject, a 
reappraisal of political risk from the conceptual point of view seems timely. Third, that 
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no author, except Green (1974) and, more recently, Jensen (2003 and 2008) has 
specifically analysed political risk in relation with political regimes.  
As Sethi and Luther pointed out, “...It seems that in much of the research effort 
on political risk, not enough attention has been paid to the development of concepts and 
definitions that capture the breadth of the problem. Unless the definitions are clear, 
other methodological issues are not likely to be resolved”(Sethi and Luther 1986:58). As 
Jarvis and Griffiths put it, the 1980s marked a renounce, by political risk analysts, to 
such a “systemic” approach, mostly because it seemed to be inevitably plagued by a 
circular logic: “Low political risk and high political stability are manifest in systems 
that are developed, predominantly Western, liberal democratic, and capitalist. By 
definition, any state that displays dissimilar characteristics represents a political risk and 
the possibility of instability” (Jarvis and Griffiths 2007:15). Nonetheless, the political 
and economic upheaval following to the financial crisis has proven that not only 
Western, liberal democratic and capitalist countries are not rid of political risks for 
foreign investors, but, on the contrary, they can indeed generate such risks. 
Therefore, a reappraisal of the concept and definition of systemic political risk 
from the point of view of empirical political science therefore seems timely. In 
particular, political risk could be defined as the probability that the profitability of an 
investment be negatively affected by circumstances ascribable either to unforeseen 
changes (e.g. revolutions, even when linked to democratization processes) in the 
domestic or international political arena, or to governmental policy choices affecting the 
international investor's property rights. In both cases, risk analysis would need to be 
conducted carefully by looking through the lenses of domestic political regimes, on the 
one hand, and of international factors. On the other hand, the role and operationalization 
of the latter aspect deserve a closer look in terms of future research agenda. In fact, as 
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far as the external or “international” dimension of risk is concerned, which some have 
conceptualised in terms of “bad neighbourhood”8 there seems to be room for 
improvement and contributions from international relations theory. 
 
III. Approaches to macro PR assessment 
 
As already clarified, country risk refers to the analysis of the creditworthiness of 
a country. A number of well-established indicators and techniques have been developed 
over time to this purpose. Among the first, there are ratios such as capital inflows/debt 
service payments, debt service payments/external debt, External debt/GDP, as well as 
the default history of a country
9
. As far as the second are concerned, the methodologies 
used include logit/probit analysis, regression analysis, Monte Carlo simulations, value at 
risk and principal components analysis, non-parametric methods such as neural 
networks
10
. 
Nonetheless, when it comes to political risk, in most cases a purely quantitative 
approach is simply impossible to apply. Events which are political in nature, such as 
revolutions, terrorist attacks, an abrupt changes in tariffs or acts of expropriation, are 
generally much more difficult to predict than sovereign default. Human judgment, 
therefore, plays a central role in political risk analysis. 
 Looking at the historic evolution of political risk assessment and monitoring, 
after surveying a number of American MNEs, Rummel and Heenan (1978) found that 
four methods were mostly used for political risk analysis:“grand tours”, “old hands”, 
                                                          
8
As in the case of the EIU Political Instability Index 2009-10, see 
http://www.economist.com/node/13349331  accessed in November 2012) 
9
 For a comprehensive list of country risk indicators, see Kosmidou, Doumpos, Zopounidis 2008: 3 
10
See Bouchet, Clark Groslambert 2003, ch. 6 
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“Delphi techniques” and “quantitative methods”. The first category encompasses efforts 
by companies to get a sense of the political and business climate recurring to company 
representatives’ visits to the potential host country. The second basically consists in 
looking for unstructured advice from experts (such as diplomats, journalists, executives 
with experience in the country in question). The third category comprises the Delphi 
techniques, developed by RAND Corporation in the 1960s, used to aggregate expert 
opinion to obtain overall indices or measures of political risk
11
. Finally, the fourth 
category embraces quantitative studies aiming at uncovering political trends resorting to 
multivariate data analysis (the authors recall how data on Soviet weaponry was useful to 
help predicting the end of detente in mid-1970s).  
Although the techniques listed are still widely used today, in the last decades the 
field of political risk has witnessed changes and evolutions. A fifth category of 
approaches can be added, with reference to efforts aimed at modelling risk on the basis 
of assumptions about the causal relationship linking some features of the political 
environment to the likelihood of political risk events. Such models are used to perform 
scenario analysis and to provide aggregate measures of political risk. For instance, 
building on the work of Robock (1971), Haner (1979), Simon (1982) and Alon (1996), 
Alon and Martin (1998) present a model of macro political risk assessment based on an 
overarching discrimination between internal and external
 
sources of risk, and a further 
distinction between societal, governmental and economic factors (internal government-
related factors, for instance, include “degree of elite repression”, “degree of elite 
illegitimacy” , “likelihood that regime change will affect economic policy”, each of 
                                                          
11
PRS Group, for instance,  uses a modified Delphi technique to obtain its country ratings. For an 
overview, see H.A. Linstone and M.Turoff, Delphi Method: Techniques and Applications, Addison-
Wesley Educational Publishers Inc (December 1975) 
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which can be assigned a score ranging from “ - 2” to “+2” – the higher the score, the 
lower the risk).  
Brink (2004) proposes a model based on three main dimensions, “political risk” 
(including 37 indicators), “economic risk” (41 indicators) and “social risk” (25 
indicators), each of which can be dropped or weighted differently according to the user's 
needs. 
Many consulting firms use models similar to the ones described. This is the case, 
for instance, of the model developed by Coplin and O’Leary, used by PRS Group to 
provide differentiated risk forecasts for three categories of investment: financial 
transactions, FDI and exports, with two different time horizons (18 months and 5 years), 
based on the estimation by country experts of the three most likely future regime 
scenarios
12. PRS Group also produces the “International Country Risk Guide” (ICRG) 
country ratings based on three categories of risk: political, financial and economic. The 
Political Risk Rating, which accounts for the 50% of the overall index, includes 12 
weighted variables covering the following political and social attributes: government 
stability, socio-economic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external 
conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, law and order, ethnic 
tensions, democratic accountability, bureaucracy quality. 
Variously designed political risk indices and models developed by other bodies 
and consulting firms, such as Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) Political 
Risk Index, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Political Instability Index, 
EURASIA's Global Political Risk Index, share some basic features with the three 
models described above, namely the reliance on the judgment of country experts, and 
the subjectivity of the weights assigned to risk factors and indicators. 
                                                          
12
See http://www.prsgroup.com/PRS_Methodology.aspx (accessed in November 2012) 
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One of the most relevant problems associated with political risk ratings is that of 
their effectiveness: how is it possible to “assess the assessment techniques”? The 
question is thorny for a number of reasons. First of all, comparisons are not easy to 
carry out because of evident reasons of competition: most ratings are provided by 
private consultants or in the context of political risk insurance and as such are not open 
for scrutiny. Second, even when they are, it is not easy to quantify politically motivated 
losses incurred by companies, in order to put them directly in relation with past political 
risk ratings and test their predictive power against actual losses (see infra, Chapter 2).  
 
IV. Approaches to micro PR assessment 
 
Definitional confusion and lack of data affect macro political risk models, like 
the ones described above, as well as sector-specific and even firm-specific models. 
 In this respect, it is important to recall that distinctive approaches depend not 
only on the dimension of the firm, but also on the business sector they belong to. For 
instance, political risk analysis has typically been a major concern for energy and 
natural resources companies, which are characterized by high sunk costs and which face 
unavoidable constraints as to the choice of the countries where to operate. In this sector, 
risk avoidance is often not an option, and the only possibility left might be trying to 
build up an adequate risk mitigation strategy. Natural resources companies have always 
been exposed, in particular, to the risk of expropriations and nationalizations (as 
happened on a massive scale in the 1970s). Although losses related to expropriation 
episodes have declined over time (the World Bank reports 423 cases of expropriation of 
foreign assets in the 1970s, against 17 during 1980-1987 and zero between 1987 and 
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1992
13
), more subtle forms of expropriation have witnessed a surge in the last years, 
assuming the physiognomy of “creeping expropriation”, e.g. in the case of increasing 
tax rates on profits, which affect the profitability of the business over time
14
. The 
vulnerability of the energy sector to political risk is also well exemplified by the losses 
incurred by natural sources companies during the Arab Spring, which swept across the 
Middle-East and North Africa (MENA) region starting from January 2011
15
. Banks 
represent yet another crucial actor with a specific standpoint on the matter. Political risk 
in the banking context can be defined as “(…) The risk that cash flows accruing to a 
country’s banks and bank investors will be adversely affected by changes in government 
policy that are independent of monetary policy considerations” (Simpson 2007 : 14). 
While also in this field political risk has often been assimilated to country/sovereign 
risk, there is a growing consciousness that it deserves specific attention
16
.  
 Moreover, although certain typologies of risk affect the business environment in 
general, there are specific risks which are likely to affect the financial sector in an 
almost exclusive fashion: with the financial crisis started in 2008, in which big 
commercial banks have been in the eye of the hurricane, political risk in the form of 
normative activity by governments aimed at regulating aspects such as capital adequacy 
requirements, bank reserves requirement (not to mention the much debated “Tobin tax” 
proposals) has witnessed a dramatic escalation. 
Specific risk models have been developed in the banking sector, such as the 
                                                          
13
MIGA Report on World Investment and Political risk (2009), MIGA- The World Bank Group, p. 28 
14
Episodes of plain expropriation still occur today, as in the recent case of the Spanish Repsol Argentine 
subsidiary YPF, nationalized in April 2012 (see Argentina announces expropriation of Repsol oil 
subsidiary YPF, EL PAIS, Francisco Peregil, Madrid/Buenos Aires April 17th 2012) 
15
 In this sense, suffice it to recall that OECD European countries imports of crude oil, natural gas liquids 
and refinery feedstocks  from Lybia dropped from 57.151 thousand metric tons in 2010  to 15.290 in 2011 
(reaching a low peak of 223 in the third quarter of the year, according to the International Energy Agency 
Monthly Oil Survey, July 2012), reflecting a dramatic drop in oil production which lasted for several 
months, due to the turmoil which culminated in the end of the 30-years rule of Muammar Gaddafi.  
16
See for instance  English, Kari, Add Political Risk to Bankers' Management Duties, Bank News 109. 12 
(Dec 2009): 28-29. 
22 
 
CAMEL model, based on the assessment of capital adequacy, asset quality, management 
quality, earnings, and liquidity, the Zonis model, based on three broad indices (Political 
Stability Index, Policy Foundations Index, Institutional Strengths Index) and the Bank 
of America model, based on ten variables : GDP per capita, real GDP growth, nominal 
GDP, trade balance, current account balance, gold reserves, external debt, money 
growth, consumer price inflation, and exchange rate (Alon, Gurumoorthy, Mitchell, 
Steen 2006 : 629-30). 
To sum up, the problem of the standpoint from which political risk assessment is 
performed is crucial (generalist vs. firm-specific and even project-specific approaches) 
and has an obvious impact on the methods and techniques chosen. The methodological 
implications of the level at which the analysis is performed, i.e. whether one is dealing 
with “macro” or “micro” political risk, to use Robock’s taxonomy, are evident: while an 
index-based approach is indispensable to provide a cross-country risk overview, and is 
necessary, for instance, for insurers or ECAs to establish to which class of risk a country 
belongs, at the lower extreme of this “ladder of generality” lay micro-risk approaches 
focusing on individual projects.  
 Micro political risk assessment also needs to take into account the stage of the 
investment-related decision making process. The initial stage, for instance, might imply 
the need to choose in which market to invest and in this case a general, cross-country 
approach might be the most appropriate one. Once the decision has been made, and the 
operational phase of the investment starts, another approach is required, focused on 
monitoring rather than rating countries.  
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V. The role of human judgement: measuring the unmeasurable? 
 
An important remark has to be made at this point (although what follows is only 
an anticipation of what will be treated more in-depth in chapter 4 infra). Be they 
generalist or sector/firm/ project specific, efforts aimed at measuring and modelling 
political risk cannot but rely on human judgement, which plays a crucial role both in 
designing models and in the concrete rating “soft” variables which cannot be measured 
otherwise. In the end, the probability of a harmful event derives from a judgement that 
“converts a political uncertainty into political risk” (Root 1972 :57). 
Models for political events forecasting are only as good as the information they 
factor in – paradoxically, even the ideal model, taking into account the truly relevant 
variables to devise the best risk mitigation strategy, would be completely useless if 
the“raw data” about those variables were flawed. 
Although this issue is often forgotten or ignored by practitioners, political risk 
assessment epitomizes the much-debated problem of measurement in social sciences
17
. 
Translating abstract concepts into numbers, and doing so effectively, requires first of all 
a clarifying effort since “concept formation stands prior to quantification”, to recall 
Sartori's famous warning (Sartori 1970), and then, inevitably, a careful validity and 
reliability check (Jackman 2008). Validity refers to the subject of measurement, and it is 
closely linked to the question of concept formation: when measuring political risk, what 
are we exactly measuring, i.e. which causal relations are we postulating between the 
abstract concept (e.g. “the risk of losses due to political causes”) and the underlying 
indicators we choose to include in our model? A valid model is the one that “hits the 
target”, and therefore it cannot exist without an unambiguous definition of the target 
                                                          
17
See for instance King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) and Brady and Collier (2004) 
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itself. Reliability, on the other hand, refers to the variability of the measurement, its 
repeatability and consistency. Indeed, is not possible to ignore the limits of expert 
political judgement. However, it can be argued that political risk assessment techniques 
would greatly benefit from a general reflection on the process of judgemental data 
construction. Schedler effectively summarizes the terms of the question by calling for 
“common standards and operating procedures” in five crucial areas: expert selection, 
measurement comparability, transparency, convergence, and accountability (Schedler 
2012: 31). In the end, assuming that one of the most important issues in political risk 
measurement is the quality of expert judgement, it has to be recognised that it depends 
heavily on the background of the expert panel (what is it meant exactly by “expert”? 
Are criteria for expert selection thoroughly codified?), on the comparability of ratings 
(are there explicit, shared standards for such ratings? Are response-style adjustment 
techniques adopted?), on the overarching issue of transparency (the lack thereof in the 
field of political risk assessment has already been underscored), on convergence (how 
are final figures measuring risk components obtained? As hinted at above, Delphi 
techniques are widely used, but other methods are also available, e.g. deliberative 
procedures to reach consensus, unstructured face-to-face meetings, the nominal group 
technique and the so-called prediction markets
18
), and, finally, on accountability, which 
necessarily entails efforts, such as the ones prescribed by Tetlock, aimed at testing 
expert performance against “standardized baseline measures of forecasting accuracy and 
timeliness of belief updating” (Tetlock 2005:234). 
  
                                                          
18
For an overview of these techniques, see Graefe and Armstrong (2011) 
25 
 
VI. Some provisional conclusions 
 
Today political risk assessment is a task of paramount importance for the 
international investor. While in the past political risk was often conceptualised in terms 
of hostile action by host countries' governments, with the quick pace of globalization its 
nature and sources have considerably changed, raising the interest of scholars belonging 
to different fields, from international economics to international relations, from 
empirical political science to psychology and decision theory. In an era in which global 
equilibria have changed and once clear-cut distinctions such as “developing” 
vs.“developed” countries are becoming more and more blurred, intelligence and risk 
management have become a major source of concern. The issue of the relationship 
between politics and the activity of international investors has become even more 
burning in light of the ongoing economic and financial crisis, a crisis whose causes are 
– at least partially – ascribable to questionable policy choices. 
From an overview of political risk literature, some issues clearly emerge: first of 
all, given the multitude of meanings attached to this term, there is still confusion about 
what political risk exactly is, and what is the best way to assess it. This holds true at 
every level of analysis, be the approach based on “micro”or “macro” political risk.  
A major challenge in this respect regards the question of how to design and 
conduct meta-studies of political risk assessment methodologies. For the reasons 
outlined above, in most cases opacity persists around the choices underlying the 
construction of models, as well as around the production and processing of the 
information that models factor in. In other words, how is it possible to better organise 
knowledge for predictive purposes, in a field that has often be regarded as an “art” more 
than a “science”? Is there a way to reach a higher level of transparency? 
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It is worth noting that comparing political risk models and indices would be 
important also to avoid the problem of circularity in studies investigating various 
aspects of political risk itself: suffice it to mention that numerous works make use of the 
same political risk data, and their findings in the end rely on the validity of such data 
(see, for instance Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta,1996, Diamonte, Liew, and Stevens 1996, 
Oetzel, Bettis, and Zenner, 2001, Simpson, 2007, Click and Weiner, 2010, who all use 
the same PR index). 
Finally, another question regards the possible contribution of political science to 
political risk analysis. As already hinted at, the literature exploring the relationship 
between domestic political regimes and political risk is scant.  
Compared to the past, relatively few authoritarian regimes remain in place. A 
large share of regimes worldwide can be classified as either democratic, or hybrid 
(Diamond 2002, Morlino 2009). Moreover, also (but not only) in light of the last wave 
of democratic change which swept across the Middle-East, it can be argued that there is 
a relationship between democratization processes and political risk, and future research 
should focus on it. In particular, it would be worth testing the hypothesis that a few key, 
aspects of the rule of law, often associated with the assessment of the “quality of 
democracy” as elaborated in Morlino (2011), can be applied more broadly, including to 
democratising and even to non-democratic regimes, to provide key indicators of 
political risk. Since different regimes seem to pose different challenges for the foreign 
investor, looking at political risk through this lens might help develop tools capable of 
more reliable and refined assessments. 
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Chapter 2 
Rating Methodologies and the Arab 
Spring : a comparative analysis  
 
A good forecaster is not smarter than everyone else, he merely has his ignorance 
better organised.  
(Anonymous) 
 
 
I. Introduction 
As anticipated in the previous chapter, for obvious reasons, an effective 
approach to the assessment and management of political risks cannot but be tailored to 
the needs of individual enterprises. In fact, what constitutes risk for a particular industry 
and even for a certain company, might well represent instead an opportunity for another 
industry or company. Yet, comprehensive, general models that allow for cross-country 
comparisons are widely used, in particular by insurance companies and export credit 
agencies which need to build country classifications in order to price their products, but 
also by managers interested in monitoring the overall risk situation of the countries in 
which they operate or they are considering to start operating. 
How well do existing models for political risk rating fulfill their task? How is it 
possible to test the performance of PR measurement tools? When it comes to capturing 
such a fuzzy concept as PR, can any lessons be drawn from the discipline of empirical 
political science? What are the theoretical foundations for such an exercise, and what 
are their implications for the construction of political risk indices? 
As PR assessment is a practice-driven task, it is not surprising that the first 
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questions arising concern the performance of the existing tools. Thus, the first logic step 
goes in the direction of disentangling the numerous causal assumptions embedded in 
those tools, showing how they relate to the discipline of empirical political science. 
One of those assumptions, the one regarding the relationship between 
institutional arrangements of host countries and risk for the foreign investor, will be 
analyzed more in detail and tested empirically. 
 
II. On the predictive power of PR models 
 
A major problem associated with political risk models is the one of their 
reliability. Although understanding and assessing political risk is an essential part of an 
enterprise’s strategic planning, the scant information about the extent to which PR 
ratings are accurate undermines their credibility. 
As anticipated, the challenge of testing these models’ predictive accuracy is 
made particularly daunting by the lack of transparency and of available data, and by the 
problem of measuring the actual losses due to politically generated events (or finding 
adequate proxies thereof). 
A few studies took up the issue of political risk modelling assessment. In a path-
breaking work in this field, Howell and Chaddick (1994) conducted a comparison 
across three different approaches to political risk assessment (the Economist, BERI, and 
PRS Group’s), building a loss indicator for 36 countries (ranging from 0 to 10), based 
on OPIC's record of payments for claims related to expropriation, inconvertibility, war 
damage, and civil strife damage, and on information drawn from “Foreign Economic 
Trends,” news reports, and corporate reports or interviews (Howell and Chaddick, 
1994:73). The predictive power of political risk indices for the period 1987-1992 was 
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then tested against the loss index resorting to multiple correlation and stepwise 
regression. 
The authors found that, among the three indices examined, the one presenting 
the highest level of correlation with the losses was the PRS Group’s, followed by BERI, 
with the Economist’s PR index scoring worse than the other two. Apart from providing 
much-needed insights on the performance of PR indices, studies like the one recalled 
here allow to assess the effect of individual components concurring to the construction 
of total indices (and also to rule out some of those components in cases of high 
multicollinearity, for instance). 
Nonetheless, the operation of building a loss index poses in itself a number of 
methodological challenges, especially regarding (but not limited to) the time and 
resources-consuming quest for reliable information about losses incurred by enterprises. 
The limitations of the loss indicator built to the purposes of the study recalled 
here are manifold: for instance, it only covered 36 countries and contained information 
limited to losses by US enterprises. 
Moreover, the extent to which results can be generalized is questionable. An 
attempt at replicating the study for the period 1994-2004 was made by Nel (2009) but 
with diverging results compared to the original. Differences in the outcome of the study 
might be explained by the partially different research design and country sample, and 
they epitomize the difficulties that observers inevitably encounter when trying to test 
the predictive power of PR models. 
The problem, however, is the general lack of available data, not only as far as 
losses are concerned, but also as regards country ratings proper. In a comparative 
analysis of country risk ratings, Oetzel, Bettis and Zenner solve the first problem by 
using currency fluctuations as a surrogate for overall country risk. However, although 
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their original intention was to compare eleven country risk measures
19
 across seventeen 
countries during a period of nineteen years, the researchers were compelled to limit their 
study to four out of eleven measures, among the other reasons, “either because it was 
cost prohibitive to purchase them (…) or because access was limited by the publisher” 
(Oetzel, Bettis and Zenner 2001: 134). 
Other, but inevitably less efficient proxies for direct losses ascribable to political 
events are inflows of FDI, widely used in panel regressions, and volatility in stock 
exchange indices. 
 
 
III. PR models: OECD, ONDD, EIU, PRS, SACE 
 
Throughout the first chapter, references have been made to the shortcomings of 
the existing methodologies for obtaining political risk country ratings. At this point, it is 
timely to present some of those models and to exemplify those shortcomings. The 
second task will be carried out in the next section, which addresses the problem of 
meta-assessment of political risk. To the first task we turn now. 
Trying to keep up with the fast pace of globalization, a number of agencies, 
public and private, have developed over time systems to respond to transnational 
investors’ increasing need for reliable ways of categorizing countries taking into 
account potential risk for business operations. PR country ratings basically aim at 
providing a snapshot of the comparative political risk situation of the countries 
considered. As already shown, political risk can be conceptualized in many different 
                                                          
19
Bank of America World Information Services, Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) S.A., 
Control Risks Group (CRG), the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Euromoney Magazine, Institutional 
Investor Magazine, International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Moody’s Investor Service, Political Risk 
Services, S.J. Rundt & Associates, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Group 
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ways, and such diversity in the approaches to operative definitions is widely reflected in 
the numerous, diverse methodologies adopted for assessment. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the definitions and methodologies adopted by five 
different agencies, some of which were already described in Chapter 1: the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Office Nationale du Ducroire 
(ONDD), the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Political Risk Services (PRS) and the 
Servizi Assicurativi per il Commercio Estero (SACE).  
These models were selected for a number of reasons. First, because analyzing 
them allows for a comparison across different categories of actors providing political 
risk ratings: an international organization (OECD), ECAs (ONDD and SACE), private 
consulting firms (EIU and PRS). Second, although they are all “Western”, those actors 
are diverse for geographic base and approaches, allowing for some diversity in the 
sample; finally, because the data on political risk used here was freely available on their 
websites (OECD, PRS, EIU, SACE) or because they accepted to provide it (ONDD). 
The first step towards an assessment of the performance of such indices is to 
give them a closer look. 
The OECD proposes a notion of country risk as a function of two categories of 
variables: transfer and convertibility risk (i.e. “the risk a government imposes capital or 
exchange controls that prevent an entity from converting local currency into foreign 
currency and/or transferring funds to creditors located outside the country”) and cases of 
force majeure (e.g. “war, expropriation, revolution, civil disturbance, floods, 
earthquakes”). The first set of variables is embedded in the Country Risk Assessment 
Model (CRAM), the second, since it is related to phenomena that are difficult to 
quantify, is incorporated in the model through a country-by-country qualitative 
assessment integrating political risk and/or other factors not accounted for by the 
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CRAM.  
The ONDD, a Belgian ECA, relies on a similar methodology. However, to the 
purposes of its activity, the ONDD differentiates between political risk for short (less 
than one year) and medium/long term export credits (more than one year), on the one 
hand, and three categories of risk (war risk, expropriation/government action and 
transfer risk) for FDI, on the other. The EIU builds a model which aims at measuring the 
level of threat posed to governments by social protest. The Political Instability Index 
features two components, an index of underlying vulnerability and an index of 
economic distress. The full methodology is available on the EIU website, and is 
reproduced in Annex II. The PRS political risk model consists of 12 variables, to which 
different weights are assigned. The variables are government stability (12 pt.), 
socioeconomic conditions (12 pt.), investment profile (12 pt.), internal conflict (12 pt.), 
external conflict (12 pt.), corruption (6 pt.), military in politics (6 pt.), religious tensions 
(6 pt.), law and order (6 pt.), ethnic tensions (6 pt.), democratic accountability (6 pt.), 
bureaucracy quality(6 pt.). As far as SACE model is concerned, PR is broken down into 
three components, i.e. expropriation risk (whose sub-dimensions are rule of law, 
property rights, government intervention, control of corruption), transfer risk (sub-
dimensions: regulatory quality, monetary policy, investment freedom, financial 
freedom) , and political violence risk (sub-dimensions: voice and accountability, 
political stability and the rule of law). 
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Table 2.1 PR definitions and models compared 
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 To the purpose of the present work, since the case studies adopted assume a time horizon prior  to 
2011, SACE’s approach to political risk is the one described in Ferrari and Rolfini (2008) 
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Before proceeding to a comparison between the existing indices, some 
preliminary concerns should be addressed, regarding the rationale for comparing models 
which at first glance appear to be quite different. 
As regards the OECD model, it is important to point out that although countries 
are ostensibly classified on the basis of country risk, comparing it to political risk 
models seems reasonable for at least two of reasons: (1) because it incorporates a 
political component, but since the details of the models are not disclosed, it is 
impossible to assess it separately (2) because the OECD classification is used as a 
benchmark for country ratings both by private agencies and by ECAs (e.g. ONDD and 
SACE are bound by the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits, 
and they both use the OECD rating as a basis for assessing the transfer risk component 
of political risk).
21
 
Similarly, although the EIU model is conceptually and technically meant to 
measure political instability, its focus on structural vulnerability and economic distress 
make it comparable to the other models. Since, as will be better illustrated in the next 
section, in this particular case the objective of this chapter is to test the performance of 
various models against the occurrence of widespread social turmoil, the five models 
considered seem equally fit for comparison – indeed, looking at how they do in a 
comparative perspective may provide some insights about their performance. 
A few comments can be made about the five rating systems described. As far as 
the OECD and the ONDD are concerned, the most critical aspects regard the methods 
and criteria according to which expert judgment contributes to the ratings (on the 
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 ONDD specifies that the premium category for political risk related  to medium-long term  export 
credits largely depends on ONDD’s obligations within the framework of the OECD Arrangement, and the 
assessment of transfer risk for FDI is  based on the  same principles (see 
http://www.ondd.be/WebONDD/Website.nsf/weben/Country+risks_Explanation(Visitors)?OpenDocume
nt accessed in April 2013) 
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problem of expert judgment, see infra, ch. 4). When it comes to the EIU, the most 
problematic aspect apparently relates to the causal assumptions embedded in the model, 
in particular as regards the relationship between regime and political stability (for a 
more comprehensive discussion thereof, see infra, Section VII). The PRS model relies 
on a web of country experts, and in this sense, to the purposes of an assessment of its 
effectiveness, at least three main concerns arise: 1) issues related to expert judgment; 2) 
like in the case of the EIU, the problem of causal assumptions and 3) the theoretical 
foundations for attributing different weights to individual determinants of risk. Since it 
relies on secondary data, SACE’s model does not raise issues of expert judgment, but 
apart from that, the same concerns raised for the PRS model apply to it. 
 
IV. MENA countries and the Arab spring as a PR case-study 
 
Few today would question that the Arab Spring represents a critical juncture in 
the history of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Equally irrefutable is the fact 
that the Arab Spring has led to policy re-adjustments by Western governments, as well 
as forcing all observers to rethink the relationship between political stability and 
authoritarian regimes
22
, in the MENA region but also elsewhere. Opinions on how this 
re-adjustments will unfold abound, but one fact is incontrovertible: political turmoil in 
the MENA came largely unexpected, and so did losses for many foreign investors 
operating in the region. 
Quantifying those losses with precision, as already explained, is quite difficult 
(see supra, section 2), but thinking of the Arab Spring, some simple yet intriguing 
questions arise: how did political risk models do in predicting the occurrence of 
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 See  Sottilotta (2013), reproduced in Annex IV  
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widespread turmoil in the MENA region? Is it possible to gain some insights from a 
comparative analysis of the performance of PR indices in this respect? 
Before turning to these questions, it is important to pinpoint the rationale for 
considering the Arab Spring a political risk case-study suitable to provide insights about 
PR assessment tout-court.  
Although a thorough analysis of the causes and consequences of the Arab Spring 
is beyond the scope of the present work, it is essential to sketch out a synthetic picture 
thereof. It is certainly difficult to single out the causes of the impressive wave of regime 
change that swept across the Middle East. To be sure, if one wished to look at the events 
through the analytical lenses of a process tracing approach, the first incident in the 
causal chain of events leading to the toppling of authoritarian regimes across the region 
would be young Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation on December 17th, 
2010. 
According to Bellin (2012 : 129) the Middle East was characterized by 
conditions that made authoritarianism particularly robust, like the fiscal health of 
coercive apparatuses (often based on natural resources rents) and their low level of 
institutionalization, the presence of international support networks (autocrats across the 
region have historically been perceived by many Western governments as the only 
alternative to political Islam), and the generally low level of popular mobilization in the 
name of political reform
23
. Factors accounting for the unexpected mobilization from 
December 2010 onwards would therefore be an emotional trigger (Bouazizi’s extreme 
gesture) and the choice by coercive apparatuses, in the case of Tunisian and Egyptian 
“successful” revolutions, not to back the regimes. Also the diffusion of social media 
certainly played a role in the uprisings. 
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 Popular mobilization would instead take place for economic reasons , for instance in case of soaring 
prices of staple goods. 
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What is important to underscore, however, is the fact that apart from contingent 
causes, structural elements are the necessary (although perhaps not sufficient) 
preconditions for the outbreak of widespread protest. Broadly speaking, the origins of 
the Arab Spring can be identified in two interrelated reform failures (Amin et al. 2012 : 
31): from a political standpoint, the failure to provide citizens with the opportunity to 
participate in political life and have access to and representation in government; from an 
economic standpoint, the failure in promoting “inclusive, fair and equitable growth”.  
 
   Table 2.2 The Arab Spring and GDP growth rate in six economies in the MENA region 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Bahrain 8,34 6,30 3,10 4,50 2,10 1,90 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 7,09 7,16 4,69 5,15 1,80 2,00 
Libya 6,00 3,80 2,10 3,70 -59,70 120,00 
Syrian Arab Rep. 5,70 4,50 6,00 3,20 -2,30 N/A 
Tunisia 6,34 4,62 3,05 3,00 -2,00 2,70 
Yemen, Rep. 3,34 3,65 3,87 7,70 -10,48 -1,90 
        Sources: World Development Indicators 2012 and CIA Factbook 
 
Turning to the economic consequences of the Arab upheavals, Table 2.2 and 
Chart 2.1 show the impact of the 2010-2011 events on the GDP growth rate of six 
economies in the region. The slump is particularly impressive in the case of Libya, 
occurrence which is easily explained recalling that the Libyan economy hinges on the 
extractive sector (therefore, cuts in oil and gas output due to the rebellion against 
Muhammar Gaddafi's regime and international sanctions had an immediate and visible 
impact on the GDP).  
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Chart 2.1: The Arab Spring and GDP growth rate in five MENA countries 
Sources: World Development Indicators 2012 and CIA Factbook 
 
However, all of the economies in the region were affected
24
. Companies 
operating in the region had to cope with major losses (e.g. the share price of Italian ENI, 
operating in Libya fell 5.1 per cent on February 2011, the biggest slump since July 
2009
25
).  Although after Gaddafi was ousted the production resumed, uncertainty in the 
country persists and to date the interests of investors in the country cannot be 
considered out of risk. As of October 2011, the costs of the Arab uprisings were reported 
to exceed $55 billion, with countries affected by civil wars (Libya and Syria) bearing 
the “economic brunt” 26, although high losses in terms of GDP were born also by Egypt, 
Tunisia, Bahrein and Yemen. Political uncertainty affected virtually all sectors of the 
economies in the region (tourism, mining, fishing), with generally decreasing inflows of 
FDI, as shown in Figure 2.1. 
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 It is important to recall that countries like the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait  did not 
experience turmoil and in turn saw their GDP  boosted by rising oil prices 
25
 “Libya's revolt scares oil traders”, February 22th 2011, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/02/201122212923942483.html 
26
 Peter Apps, The Economic Impact of The “Arab Spring” Uprisings,  The National Post, Oct. 14 2011 
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Figure 2.1 The economic impact of the Arab Spring two years later 
 
 
Source: Deutsche Bank (2013) 
 
It is for the reasons outlined above that looking at how political risk rating 
models did with respect to the Arab uprisings is particularly salient and could provide 
insights on possible conceptual improvements on the relative indices. 
 
V. The predictive power of PR models and the Arab spring 
 
Let us go back to the first question asked at the beginning of the previous 
section. How did political risk models do in predicting the occurrence of widespread 
turmoil in the MENA region?  
Table 2.3 shows the political risk “top fifteen” of EIU, PRS and SACE before 
the outbreak of the Arab upheavals.  
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Table 2.3 Top risk countries according to PRS, SACE, EIU27 
# PRS # SACE # EIU 
1 Somalia 1 Somalia 1 Zimbabwe 
2 Congo, D.R. 2 Iraq 2 Chad 
3 Iraq 3 Afghanistan 3 Congo, D.R. 
4 Sudan 4 Congo, D.R. 4 Cambodia 
5 Cote d'Ivoire 5 Zimbabwe 4 Sudan 
6 Haiti 6 Korea, North 6 Iraq 
7 Guinea 7 Sudan 7 Cote d'Ivoire 
8 Zimbabwe 8 Myanmar 7 Haiti 
9 Nigeria 9 Uzbekistan 7 Pakistan 
10 Myanmar 10 Liberia 7 Zambia 
10 Pakistan 11 Eritrea 7 Afghanistan 
12 Venezuela 12 Turkmenistan 7 
Central African 
Republic 
13 Korea, D.P.R. 13 West Bank Gaza 13 North Korea 
13 Niger 14 Haiti 14 Bolivia 
15 Ethiopia 15 Iran 14 Ecuador 
 
Because the rankings by OECD and ONDD are not based on continuous but on 
categorical values, the countries belonging to the top risk categories (6 and 7) are shown 
separately in Table 2.4 
What is evident at first glance is that none of the countries which were about to 
experience dramatic political change were included in the “ top fifteen” of political risk 
in the ranking provided by PRS, SACE and EIU . 
Tunisia and Egypt, the countries which experienced a drastic change of regime, 
                                                          
27
 Data for PRS refers to October 2010, for SACE to 2008, for the EIU to 2009-10 
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ranked 93
rd
 and 32
nd
 respectively out of 140 countries according to PRS’ approach, 
134
th
 and 106
th
 out of 165 according to the EIU’s, 109th and 62nd out of 209 according to 
SACE. According to the EIU political instability index, Tunisia in 2009-10 scored better 
for political stability and economic distress than Italy, France and the UK (which 
occupied respectively the 110
th
 , 121
st
 and 132
nd
 position in the ranking). 
 
Table 2.2 Most risky countries according to each model 
 
OECD 
 
ONDD 
 
“category 7”  
countries 
 
Afghanistan, Belarus, 
Bosnia and H., 
Ethiopia, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Liberia, 
Malawi, Maldives, 
Mauritania, Moldova, 
Myanmar,Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Niger, 
Pakistan, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan, 
Tajikistan, Togo, 
Ukraine, Venezuela, 
Yemen 
 
“category 7” countries 
 
 
Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Palestine, Somalia 
 
 
“category 6” countries 
 
Burundi, Congo, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Guinea, Haiti, Iran, 
Kyrgyzstan, Korea 
(North), Myanmar, 
Pakistan, Sudan, 
Chad, Western 
Sahara, Zimbabwe 
 
Data contained in the table refers to year 2010  
  
The absence of any of the autocracies of the MENA region in the list of top risk 
countries (apart from Yemen) is equally striking in the case of OECD classification. The 
same can be said for the ONDD: if we take a closer look at ONDD war risk rating for 
2010, we will immediately notice that Egypt, Tunisia and Syria were classified as 
belonging to “category 4”, along with countries such as Malta, New Zealand and the 
Philippines.  
Adding the time dimension to this cross-sectional analysis, another remark can 
be added: if we compare PRS political risk rating dating back to October 2010 with the 
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one related to January 2011, while Tunisia’s score plunged (according to PRS’ coding 
system, the highest the risk, the lowest the score a country receives), Egypt remained 
almost unvaried. This epitomizes what can be considered to be another possible 
shortcoming of PR indices, i.e. the fact that they generally do not seem to systematically 
take into account possible regional contagion effects. As well known, democratization 
“waves” have often unfolded in the past according to regional trends. None of the 
models analyzed seems to incorporate this hypothesis. To be sure, if modeling social 
reality is quite a difficult task, modeling the impact of international variables on 
political risks is even harder. However, in light of the Arab Spring but also of 
democratization theory, it might be timely to start and make some efforts in this sense. 
 
VI. On causation, prediction and measurement in the social sciences 
 
Skeptics have often labeled efforts at predicting social events as “crystal ball 
exercises”28. Moreover, a diffused opinion among social scientists assigns prediction an 
inferior epistemic status with respect to “explanation”. To paraphrase Philip Schrodt’s 
effective metaphor, this can indeed be considered to be one of the “seven deadly sins” in 
contemporary quantitative political analysis.
29
 In fact, explanation in itself would be 
pointless if it did not provide us with insights about (possible) future events. Thus, it 
should be stressed that although it is certainly impossible to find deterministic laws in 
social reality, it is indeed possible to devise tools to better organize available data in 
order to know which scenarios are more likely and to design appropriate risk mitigation 
                                                          
28
 Robert Adler, “The Crystal Ball of Chaos”, in Nature, Vol. 414, November 29th  2001  
29
 Philip A. Schrodt, “Seven Deadly Sins in Contemporary Quantitative Political Analysis”, Paper 
prepared for the theme panel \A Sea Change in Political Methodology?" at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, Washington, 2 - 5 September 2010 
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strategies. 
Evidently, the question rests on epistemological, ontological, and explanatory 
assumptions (Bevir 2008:2). In this sense, going back to the roots of the problem, there 
are two ways of approaching political risk forecasting, in what we could define as a 
declination of the classic structure vs. agency debate in the social sciences.  
The first could be defined as a “structuralist” one, and it is based on the general 
assumption that a careful examination of the features of a country’s power structure can 
help predict the occurrence of political events. This is the case of the CIA-sponsored 
State Failure Task Force and in general of all PR ratings examined here. The second 
approach instead focuses on actors – a prominent example of it being behavioral 
approaches to political science. For instance, Bueno de Mesquita applies game theory to 
successfully predict policy outcomes.
30
 While its potential for reaping accurate and 
reliable forecasts applied to individual cases is high, one big drawback of this kind of 
approach is that it is difficult if not impossible to use it in large scale cross-country 
analyses aiming at producing country ratings. 
At this point a question may arise, i.e. , what are the ontological commitments of 
the present study? Are we trying to attribute causal powers (speaking of the causes of 
political risk) to something that is not an actor, but rather a structure? In this respect, is 
there a way to avoid reification, meant as “the illegitimate attribution of agency to 
entities that are not actors” (Sibeon 1999)? The approach adopted here is in line with the 
distinction drawn by Lewis (2000:20-21)
 31
. Within an Aristotelian framework, we 
distinguish the efficient cause (the sculptor who realizes a work) from the material 
cause (the material used by the sculptor cannot be said to have “causal powers”, yet it 
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 See, among the others, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “The Predictioneer’s game: Using the logic of 
Brazen Self-Interest to See and Shape the Future”, New York: Random House (2010) 
31
 Both Lewis’ and Sibeon’s arguments are based on a critical realist theoretical approach, as developed 
by Bhaskar, 1989, 1995 and  Archer, 1995 
44 
 
constraints the outcome). In other words, just as the features of the craftsman’s product 
depend on the available tools and raw materials, so the outcome of social actors’ 
initiatives depend on pre-existing social structure, which cannot initiate activity but still 
constraints the actors’ choices. 
Similarly, studying political risk from a “structural” point of view does not 
translate into ignoring the fact that risk mainly depends on the features, perspectives and 
choices of the actor (the international investor). Rather, it means to focus on the 
environmental constraints with which any actor has to cope, when making investment 
decisions.  
Going back to the problem of causation proper, it is important to remember once 
again that PR indices are models in which numerous causal hypotheses are embedded, 
and it is for this reason that any robust methodology for political risk measurement 
should include a thorough explanation of the theoretical underpinnings of such 
hypotheses. 
In the last years, the measurement of political concepts has come to the fore as a 
key challenge for social scientists. The publication of the seminal work “Designing 
Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research” by King, Keohane and 
Verba ,
32
 boosted a fruitful debate about scientific inference in qualitative research. If, 
on the one hand, diverging opinions still exist about whether or not quantitative and 
qualitative research are fundamentally different in terms of logic of inference
33
, on the 
other hand there is a widespread convergence on the idea that causal language should be 
used with caution in social sciences and that the quantitative template leaves some 
                                                          
32
 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, Sidney Verba: Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research. Princeton University Press (1994) 
33
 See for instance H. R. Brady, Doing Good and Doing Better: How Far Does the QuantitativeTemplate 
Get Us?, in H. R. Brady and David Collier (eds.) Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared 
Standards,  Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield (2004) 
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important problems open (e.g. in the case of omitted variables and endogeneity)
34
. 
An in-depth discussion of the problem of causation in the social world does not 
fall within the scope of the present work. However, due to its paramount importance to 
any measurement endeavor, it is timely to recall briefly the terms of such problem. 
Gerring (2005 : 169) proposes a minimal definition of causation: “Minimally, 
causes may be said to refer to events or conditions that raise the probability of some 
outcome occurring (under ceteris paribus conditions). X may be considered a cause of Y 
if (and only if ) it raises the probability of Y”. 
To be sure, claiming to be able to single out causes in non-experimental contexts 
under ceteris paribus conditions is a bold assertion. Still, a structured reflection about 
the probabilistic causes of losses for the foreign investor should lay at the heart of 
political risk modeling. Like the field of the measurement of democracy, political risk 
assessment is characterized by a gap between academia and practitioners, between 
theory and practice. Real-world and business operations require quick responses to 
practical problems, but it must be taken into account that any attempt at organizing and 
using empirical data without underlying theory to provide guidance is meaningless and 
can indeed be counterproductive. In this sense, many lessons coming from the literature 
on democratization and on the measurement of democracy could and perhaps should be 
applied to PR to the purpose of developing self-conscious assessment frameworks.  
Although its focus in terms of data “final user” is quite different (being the PR’s 
one the transnational enterprise) assessing the quality of democracy features problems 
which are extremely relevant to the field of political risk. Munck (2009: 13-37) 
effectively summarizes three kinds of challenges which are crucial to bridge the gap 
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 David Collier, Jason Seawright, and Gerardo L. Munck, The Quest for Standards:King, Keohane, and 
Verba’s Designing Social Inquiry  in Brady and Collier (2004) cit.   p. 60 
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between scholars and practitioners in the measurement of democracy, and at the same 
time are of great relevance also as far as political risk is concerned: conceptualization, 
measurement, and aggregation. Conceptualization is the first, essential step in any 
measurement exercise. As already discussed (see supra, Chapter 1) political risk is 
definitely plagued by conceptual confusion, which also make difficult to conduct 
smooth comparisons among different models. As will be further illustrated later on (see 
infra, Chapter 3) conceptualization entails the identification of the dimensions of the 
concept and their organization (quite common problems in this sense are redundancy 
and conflation). Measurement is another core challenge, raising issues of validity (i.e. 
making sure that measure and dimension measured are coincident or at least as closely 
linked as possible), reliability (which also calls into question the way in which data are 
generated – on this subject, see infra, Chapter 4), and replicability/publicity (a 
particularly burning issue in political risk assessment). Finally, aggregation also matters, 
meaning by it the way in which different data, coming from different sources are 
combined to obtain indices. If the default rule is often addition, it should be noticed that 
such a choice – as well as that related to weights assigned to dimensions – is not rid of 
theoretical implications and should always be justified. 
It is clear, at this point, that causation, prediction and measurement in social 
sciences cannot but be inextricably intertwined. 
A concrete example of how the specifications of a model are necessarily theory-
laden regards the relationship between political stability and democracy. The next 
section will focus on this particular aspect of political risk, highlighting the importance 
of theoretical underpinnings of every single dimension of the concept we are willing to 
operationalize for measurement. 
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VII. Risk dimensions and built-in causal hypotheses: PR and regime 
type 
 
A datum that any conscious user of PR ratings should take into account is clear: 
any sub-dimension which be operationalized to represent numerically a component of 
risk is a statement about a causal relationship linking one or more “independent” or 
“explanatory” variables and a “dependent” or “outcome” one. A good example to 
illustrate the relevance of this assertion and its impact on PR assessment is the 
relationship between a country’s political regime and its risk profile. 
Although a rich literature exists about the determinants of FDI, little has been 
said about the mechanisms that link political institutions to risk for foreign investors – 
still, the question has emerged over time. In their PR meta-assessment study of 1994, 
for instance, Howell and Chaddick criticize the (old) Economist’s model because it 
incorporates an inverse causal relationship between authoritarianism and political 
stability, i.e. it considers authoritarianism as a factor that jeopardizes instead of 
enhancing the stability of a given polity.  
Historically, Howell and Chaddick hold, “authoritarian rule has been both 
characterized and justified as necessary or contributing to stability”.35 Therefore, 
following this line of reasoning, at least in the short term authoritarianism could be 
positively linked to stability and the theoretical foundations of the Economist’s 
approach would be flawed. 
Interestingly and somewhat surprisingly, the more recent EIU Political 
Instability Index seems to embrace such criticism, as when it comes to assess political 
stability, it assigns the same “stability score” to democracies and to autocracies, while 
attributing a lower score to hybrid regimes. 
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 Howell and Chaddick, cit. p. 76 
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Coming back to the main problem at issue, there are a number of ways in which 
a country’s institutional arrangements may influence the activity of foreign investors. 
Notably, a major source of concern regards the possibility of expropriations of foreign 
investments. A recent research by the World Bank
36
 besides providing empirical 
support for the distinction between sovereign risk (risk of government default) and 
political risk (of which expropriation risk can be considered to be a sub-type), confirms 
the existence of a correlation between poor policy performance and both risks. 
Although expropriation proper remains perhaps the most catastrophic event for 
the international enterprise, politically-induced losses, as already shown (see supra, 
Chapter 1) can also derive from the so-called creeping expropriation, i.e. the 
introduction of adverse fiscal regulation.  
Another obvious source of risk is the occurrence of political violence or regime 
change, like in the case of the MENA countries examined above. In this case, losses 
may derive from damages to plants and/or to the personnel, not to mention the possible 
repercussions in terms of share price due to the subsequent climate of uncertainty that 
inevitably affects business operations. 
Although all political in nature, these risks are quite different and should 
therefore be measured recurring to different tools. For instance, while expropriation risk 
presupposes the existence of a government with the capacity to enforce regulation and 
materially execute expropriation, violence risk may instead be higher in cases in which 
institutions are weak. 
Building on the work of Jensen (2008) and Jensen and Young (2008), two sets of 
simple models are presented here to test the effect of different institutional arrangements 
on two categories of political risk : expropriation risk and war risk. 
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The baseline model replicates with more recent data the ordered probit one 
estimated by Jensen (2008:1046) to assess the impact of democracy on political risk 
pricing categories :  
 
Risk = α + β1 Democracy +β2 GDP Growth + β3 GDP +β4 Europe   + β5 Latin America 
+  β6 SS Africa  +  β7 North Africa +  β8 Eastern Europe +  β9 Asia + β10 
Oceania + εi 
 
In the first set of models (see table 2.4) the dependent variable is expropriation 
risk measured in terms of insurance pricing for year 2012. The rating chosen is the 
ONDD one. Data on the explanatory variables is from years 2009-2010, meaning that in 
all calculations the output is lagged two years behind the explanatory variables. 
Thus, although the models are formally cross-sectional, in practice they contain 
information on the interaction between institutional environment and risk over time. 
The source of data on GDP and GDP growth (expressed in US dollars) is the 
World Bank World Development Indicators database
37
. Data on democracy instead is 
from the well-known Polity IV Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-
2011 data set
38
. 
The democracy indicator is an additive 0-10 scale derived from codings of four 
main components: the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and 
competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive.
39
 
Another important feature of the models presented, which distinguishes them from the 
one originally estimated by Jensen (2008), is that a further “political regime” dummy 
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 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
38
 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm  
39
 See Polity IV Dataset Users’ Manual, pp. 14 and following, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2010.pdf 
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variable is used to introduce a more refined distinction, to gain insights about the risk 
environment in the so-called hybrid regimes. In fact, in recent years, growing attention 
has been paid to institutional arrangements that cannot be satisfactorily classified as 
democratic, but at the same time cannot be labeled as traditional authoritarian regimes 
either. A vast array of definitions was developed to designate such arrangements, such 
as ‘competitive authoritarianisms’ (Levitsky and Way 2002), ‘partial 
democracies’(Epstein et al., 2006), ‘electoral authoritarianisms’ (Schedler 2009), to 
quote only few of them. Conceptual endeavors by Diamond (2002) and more recently 
Morlino (2009 and 2011) led to the following definition of “hybrid regime”: “A set of 
institutions that have been persistent, be they stable or unstable, for at least a decade, 
have been preceded by authoritarianism, a traditional regime (possibly with colonial 
characteristics), or even a minimal democracy, and are characterized by the break-up of 
limited pluralism and forms of independent, autonomous participation, but the absence 
of at least one of the four aspects of a minimal democracy”40 (Morlino 2011 : 56). To 
the purpose of this study, the empirical notion of hybrid regime hinges on the aspect of 
duration over time: following Morlino (2011), in order to single out empirical instances 
of hybrid regimes data provided by the Freedom House was used to create a dummy 
variable called “Hyb_dum” for those countries whose regimes were classified as 
“partially free” for at least 10 consecutive years between 1989 and 2010. Countries 
which do not meet this requirement were classified as authoritarian or democratic, on 
the basis of the Freedom House and Polity IV data.  
 
  
                                                          
40
 The minimal definition of democracy suggests that such a regime has, at least, the following: universal, 
adult suffrage; recurring, free, competitive and fair elections; more than one political party; and more than 
one source of information (Morlino 2004) 
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Table 2.4: Political regime and expropriation risk 
 
   
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
chi2                      171.216         163.070         169.248   
R2                                                                  
Pseudo                                                              
N                         127.000         127.000         139.000   
                                                                    
                          (-2.49)         (-1.57)         (-1.51)   
Constant                   -3.767*         -2.605          -2.356   
cut6                                                                
                                                                    
                          (-2.74)         (-1.79)         (-1.75)   
Constant                   -4.133**        -2.961          -2.717   
cut5                                                                
                                                                    
                          (-3.30)         (-2.32)         (-2.29)   
Constant                   -5.077***       -3.899*         -3.654*  
cut4                                                                
                                                                    
                          (-3.81)         (-2.86)         (-2.83)   
Constant                   -6.134***       -4.974**        -4.699** 
cut3                                                                
                                                                    
                          (-4.18)         (-3.24)         (-3.24)   
Constant                   -6.839***       -5.707**        -5.456** 
cut2                                                                
                                                                    
                          (-4.48)         (-3.58)         (-3.58)   
Constant                   -7.661***       -6.569***       -6.261***
cut1                                                                
                                                                    
                                                           (2.42)   
rent from natural ~o                                        0.019*  
                                           (1.82)          (1.85)   
Hyb_dum                                     0.505           0.518   
                                           (3.35)          (2.86)   
Aut_dum                                     0.928***        0.833** 
                              (.)             (.)             (.)   
o.northamerica              0.000           0.000           0.000   
                           (0.49)          (1.29)          (0.56)   
oceania                     0.224           0.749           0.350   
                           (1.77)          (2.20)          (2.58)   
asia                        0.843           1.014*          1.176** 
                           (2.43)          (2.94)          (2.80)   
eefsu                       1.081*          1.152**         1.106** 
                           (4.42)          (3.88)          (3.69)   
northafricamiddlee~t        1.881***        1.624***        1.656***
                           (1.95)          (2.20)          (2.19)   
subsaharanafrica            0.912           1.009*          0.952*  
                           (2.58)          (3.39)          (3.75)   
latamcarib                  1.292**         1.650***        1.755***
                          (-1.19)         (-0.93)         (-1.18)   
europe                     -0.559          -0.415          -0.519   
                          (-5.11)         (-4.51)         (-4.42)   
gdp_log                    -0.842***       -0.769***       -0.729***
                           (3.04)          (1.85)                   
gdpg_log                    0.305**         0.184                   
                          (-3.55)                                   
democ                      -0.023***                                
exprop2012                                                          
                                                                    
                              b/t             b/t             b/t   
                       democracy1         hybrid1      exprop_res   
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As far as the first set of models is concerned (Table 2.4), the existence of a statistically 
significant and inverse relationship between the level of democracy and expropriation 
risk is confirmed. Controls include the level of GDP and regional dummies (model 1: 
“Democracy1”). Democracy is a good predictor for lower risk of expropriation also 
when including in the baseline model a measure of rents from natural resources, which 
is associated with lower levels of democracy (in line with the extant literature on the so-
called “resources curse”), but the hybrid regime dummy apparently bears no statistically 
significant effect on the explained variable. When it comes the second set of models 
(Table 2.5), instead, results are different. The dependent variable here is ONDD 
category for “war risks”, which include “risks of external conflict and the risks of 
domestic political violence. Apart from the extreme case of civil war, domestic political 
violence also covers risks of terrorism, civil unrest, socio-economic conflicts and racial 
and ethnic tension”.41 
Even after controlling for GDP and resource rents, empirical evidence supports 
the hypothesis that, although operating both in an authoritarian and in a hybrid regime 
increases the likelihood of incurring in political violence compared to operating in a 
democracy, there is a statistically significant difference between authoritarian and 
hybrid regimes. That is, there is further empirical evidence, apart from that already 
revealed by the extant literature, suggesting that political risk is not regime-neutral and a 
calling for further research to explore the different ways in which institutional 
arrangements influence the risk environment in which foreign investors operate . 
 
  
                                                          
41
 See  ONDD “Explanation” web page, 
http://www.ondd.be/WebONDD/Website.nsf/weben/Country+risks_Explanation(Visitors)?OpenDocume
nt#P2a accessed in March 2013 
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Table 2.5: Political regime and war risk 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
chi2                      145.186         147.902         151.173   
R2                                                                  
Pseudo                                                              
N                         132.000         132.000         147.000   
                                                                    
                          (-2.45)         (-0.91)         (-1.71)   
Constant                   -3.191*         -1.189          -2.253   
cut6                                                                
                                                                    
                          (-3.02)         (-1.48)         (-2.38)   
Constant                   -4.041**        -2.016          -3.242*  
cut5                                                                
                                                                    
                          (-3.51)         (-1.97)         (-2.90)   
Constant                   -4.741***       -2.682*         -3.989** 
cut4                                                                
                                                                    
                          (-4.05)         (-2.55)         (-3.45)   
Constant                   -5.475***       -3.442*         -4.718***
cut3                                                                
                                                                    
                          (-4.68)         (-3.30)         (-4.13)   
Constant                   -6.377***       -4.459***       -5.648***
cut2                                                                
                                                                    
                          (-5.26)         (-3.98)         (-4.86)   
Constant                   -7.201***       -5.422***       -6.649***
cut1                                                                
                                                                    
                                                           (2.75)   
rent from natural ~o                                        0.018** 
                                           (3.54)          (3.36)   
Hyb_dum                                     1.075***        0.971***
                                           (4.13)          (3.68)   
Aut_dum                                     1.418***        1.229***
                              (.)             (.)             (.)   
o.northamerica              0.000           0.000           0.000   
                           (0.49)          (2.14)          (0.05)   
oceania                     0.275           1.305*          0.039   
                           (1.37)          (2.68)          (0.19)   
asia                        0.652           1.011**         0.116   
                           (1.92)          (3.07)          (0.39)   
eefsu                       0.896           1.104**         0.234   
                           (4.02)          (3.67)          (1.40)   
northafricamiddlee~t        1.916***        1.737***        0.962   
                           (0.90)          (1.67)         (-0.37)   
subsaharanafrica            0.487           0.745          -0.235   
                           (1.41)          (3.50)          (0.95)   
latamcarib                  0.659           1.386***        0.570   
                          (-0.89)         (-0.25)         (-1.17)   
europe                     -0.469          -0.111          -0.715   
                          (-5.84)         (-5.02)         (-5.67)   
gdp_log                    -0.770***       -0.656***       -0.709***
                           (0.98)         (-0.61)                   
gdpg_log                    0.108          -0.071                   
                          (-3.61)                                   
democ                      -0.026***                                
war2012                                                             
                                                                    
                              b/t             b/t             b/t   
                      democracyw1        hybridw1         war_res   
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VIII. Preliminary empirical conclusions 
 
In a renowned article, Henisz highlighted four major faults from which measures 
of political variables affecting the economic environment suffer: 
“First, many of them are not closely linked to a government’s ability to credibly 
commit not to interfere with private property rights. Second, they are subjectively 
measured. Third, they are available only for limited time periods and/or sample of 
countries. Finally, they are often employed in an a-theoretical manner” (Henisz 2000:4). 
From the analysis conducted so far, a few preliminary conclusions can be drawn. 
The first is that Henisz’s points are still highly relevant : in particular, as shown 
throughout the chapter, the problem of the a-theoretical use (and construction) of 
political data is still widespread (for a more in-depth analysis of the “subjectivity” 
problem, see infra, ch. 4). 
This is especially evident in light of the performance of the five country rankings 
analyzed above against the backdrop of the Arab uprisings. While any model for 
political risk forecasting necessarily incorporates a number of causal hypotheses about 
what constitutes political risk, the comparison drawn here suggests that often those 
hypotheses are developed in an a-theoretical manner and lack empirical support – 
indeed, some of these models, which can reach a remarkable level of sophistication, 
look like “giants with feet of clay” – even more so if we think about the problem of 
conceptual confusion which plagues political risk analysis (see Chapter 1 ). 
 Moreover, some empirical clues emerge to question the claim that authoritarian 
regimes, in spite of poor records in terms of respect of the rule of law, can still be 
committed to the protection of (foreign investors’) property rights (see Jensen 2008 on 
expropriation risk). In addition, the question of the durability and sustainability of 
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authoritarian vis-à-vis democratic regimes, and the way in which we conceptualize them 
also clearly emerges with strong bearings on political risk modeling. Index-building 
issues will be accordingly scrutinized in the next chapter. 
Finally, there seems to be room for further research on the relationship between 
the political system and risk for FDI, in particular as far as hybrid regimes are 
concerned. 
 What is risky for foreign investors in the context a hybrid regime, in what does 
it differ from an authoritarian regime and also from a democratic institutional 
framework is a subject for further investigation. 
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Chapter 3 
Operationalization  
 
Theory is your best friend. 
(G. Jasso) 
 
 
I.  “Getting one’s hands dirty” 
 
Some points clearly emerge from the previous chapters. The most evident is that 
conceptual confusion still dominates the field of political risk analysis and that such 
confusion is not always acknowledged. Even those authors who acknowledge 
conceptual confusion, mostly limit themselves to taking stock of the existing PR 
definitions (see Chapter 1) and they rarely “get their hands dirty” by trying to point out 
what does not work about the models and what could be done to improve them
42
. 
Thus, so far the attempts made at bridging the gap between scholarship and 
practitioners are not completely satisfactory. In the attempt of starting to fill this gap, 
this chapter unwraps as follows: first, the extant endeavors aiming at reconstructing the 
theoretical foundations for political risk assessment exercises are reviewed and an 
attempt is made at grounding them in the discipline of comparative politics, in particular 
as regards the sub-field of the measurement of the quality of democracy. Then, the main 
sources of conceptual confusion are explored and some rules for concept-building in 
political risk analysis are proposed. Finally, those rules are applied, a possible 
conceptualization of political risk is operationalized and a PR index is accordingly built 
and compared to two of the existing ones. 
                                                          
42
Jensen (2008), Howell and Chaddick (1994) and Howell (2007) being notable exceptions. 
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II. What theory for political risk? 
 
As highlighted in the conclusion to the previous chapter, a relevant problem in 
PR assessment is that it is often carried out in an a-theoretical manner. However, 
theoretically un-aware as they may be, all models necessarily factor in assumptions 
which are theoretical in nature. 
 Howell points out that “The theory determines what kind of predictive variables 
are examined, how they are measured, and how they are combined to generate an 
overall risk rating. Although theories are seldom explicated by the various ratings 
systems, they exist nevertheless and can usually be derived from an examination of the 
system or model utilized” (Howell 2007: 13). Although this is certainly true and it is a 
realistic description of the state of the art, what it is argued here is that in order to avoid 
conceptual and theoretical loopholes, theory behind models (and not just methodology) 
should always be made explicit and open to scrutiny. 
What theory for political risk measurement then? Starting from this question, it 
is possible to point to at least two streams of literature in the social sciences intersecting 
the sub-field of political risk analysis. 
 The first is the one broadly exploring the determinants of FDI. Such stream 
could be referred to as a “macro” approach to risk, because it looks at the interaction 
between two complex actors, the host government and the multinational enterprise. 
Vernon (1971) famously proposed an explanation of the activity of the MNEs based on 
the “obsolescing bargain” theory, theorizing in this framework a competitive interplay 
between MNEs and host governments, in the context of a constantly shifting bargaining 
power. In this case, PR is mainly conceived of in terms of breach of contract and risk of 
expropriation or nationalization. Dunning (1988) in proposing an eclectic approach to 
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the activity of the multinational enterprise stresses the role of economic development as 
a major determinant of FDI, with little emphasis on the political setting of the host 
countries. Henisz (2000) finds that the institutional environments of countries matter 
when it comes to measuring “contractual hazards” and “political hazards”. However, 
also in this case, PR is conceived of as adverse government action. 
Drawing some conclusions from this kind of discourse, it can be said that that 
the subject has been studied either from a micro point of view, i.e. from the point of 
view of the individual enterprise, or from a macro point of view, i.e. looking at the big 
picture but sometimes forgetting about the specific standpoint of the enterprise. The 
attention of scholars of multinational enterprise focused primarily on the determinants 
of foreign direct investment (FDI). Political hazards have generally been included 
among these determinants, but apparently the dialogue between two different 
disciplines, theory on international production and political science, has been only 
limited. 
The second stream of literature dealing with PR is the one related to decision 
theory. In one of the rare reflections in the extant literature on the theoretical grounding 
of political risk analysis, Brink (2004, ch. 2) suggests that “where political risk analysis 
is a first step in decision making regarding foreign investment optimalization, political 
risk assessment focuses on problems that call for decisions concerning the 
implementation of actions (investment), and in a way, deals with decision problems” 
(2004:29). Thus, the theoretical framework to which political risk analysis (and PR 
measurement, which can be considered as a sub-type of PR analysis) should be ascribed 
is the one of “problem solving theory” and “decision theory”. In this respect, risk is 
relevant in two different ways: first, in the assessment phase by the raters, second when 
the rating is processed by decision makers. 
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However, although decision theory certainly provides useful insights for 
understanding how investors use information to decide “whether, when and where to 
invest” (Brink 2004:30), in a nutshell how PR ratings are employed, it does not seem to 
be equally relevant when it comes to producing those ratings. 
As a consequence, we should look elsewhere if we aim at providing PR 
assessment with credible theoretical bases. In this sense, it should equally be recalled 
that when building models to compare states across a number of dimensions associated 
to higher or lower risk for investors, many issues emerge that are similar to those 
encountered by political scientists when comparing political regimes for other purposes. 
In particular, the process and practice of measuring political risk seems to pose 
challenges which are similar to those faced when measuring the quality of democracy, 
for at least two orders of reasons. 
First of all, measuring risk and measuring democracy share all the problems 
related to measuring a latent variable. Those problems include providing unambiguous 
working definitions which be rid of conceptual confusion, operationalize them, and 
possibly resorting to expert judgment. 
Second, if we maintain, as shown in the previous chapter, that macro political 
risk is not regime-neutral, then we implicitly admit that by fine tuning our 
understanding of the features of a country’s political arrangements it will be possible to 
shed light also on that country's risk environment. Concepts and indicators which play a 
key role when it comes to measuring the quality of democracy are also relevant for 
measuring risk (suffice it to mention for the moment the rule of law, which is inversely 
related with the risk of contract breach). 
In the next sections, lessons drawn from conceptualizing and measuring 
democracy will be applied to PR measurement. The first step in this sense will be to try 
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to solve conceptual and definitional conundrums. 
 
III. Sources of conceptual confusion 
 
Taking stock of the analysis conducted so far, PR as a field of inquiry appears to 
be plagued by conceptual confusion. Such confusion stems from at least three different 
sources: (1) the existence of homonymies (2) the existence of synonymies, (3) vagueness 
in the relationship between the word and the referent. 
Homonymies occur when the same word is used with different meanings. In the 
previous paragraph, five alternative definitions were identified, but at least one more 
can be mentioned, which constitutes a radical departure from PR as treated here: 
Political risk is sometimes referred to as the risk of non re-election of political leaders. 
For instance, Althaus (2008), in her volume “Calculating Political Risk”, defines PR as 
the calculation that political actors (of western liberal-democracies) make before 
promoting a certain policy- i.e. the calculation of the “political cost” of decisions in 
terms of loss of votes in future elections. 
Synonymies in the literature also abound, the most widespread being the one 
which equates political risk with political instability. This is indeed a conceptual 
loophole because although they are certainly interrelated, the two terms describe 
different things. Political instability appears to be a controversial concept in itself, 
especially if one looks at how its contrary, i.e. political stability, is defined. After 
surveying the relevant literature, for instance, Hurwitz identifies five different 
approaches to political stability: “(a) the absence of violence; (b) governmental 
longevity/duration; (c) the existence of a legitimate constitutional regime; (d) the 
absence of structural change; and (e) a multifaceted societal attribute” (Hurwitz 1973). 
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This confusion has lingered for a long time, despite the attempts by several authors 
writing on PR to clearly distinguish it from political instability (e.g. Robock 1971). 
Another form of synonymy is the one that roughly equates political risk to country risk 
and sovereign risk (see for instance Kobran, Hansen and Kopper 2004:3). 
A third source of confusion has been individuated in the vagueness of the 
relationship between word and referent. Many authors, more or less unconsciously, end 
up equating political risk to the negative event(s) that can affect the operations of 
MNEs. This is the approach, for example, of the World Economic Forum (WEF) 2012 
Report on Global Risk. Global risks are defined as “...Having global geographic scope, 
cross-industry relevance, uncertainty as to how and when they will occur, and high 
levels of economic and/or social impact requiring a multi-stakeholder 
response”(emphasis added). The semantic confusion is evident. Risk is a condition of a 
given subject: either one (individual, group, MNE, etc.) is at risk , or not. In definitions 
such as the one quoted above, PR is confused with particular events, that should be 
instead classified as potential causes of risk. A question arises at this point: should PR 
be considered as a “property” of the environment, independent of any actor that operates 
within the environment itself, or is it rather, as some authors seem to suggest a 
“property” of the international investor, depending on “the characteristics of the foreign 
investment: who owns it, what technology it uses, and to what economic sector it 
belongs”(Schmidt 1986) ? The question is not banal, as it bears important epistemic 
consequences (on the problem of framing risk in terms of “agency” or “structure”, see 
supra ch. 2 § 6). As in many instances, the truth lies perhaps somewhere in between, 
and political risk arises from the interaction between economic operator and political 
environment (here intended as political regime). The problem with PR is that, as often 
happens in social sciences, an actual referent (i.e. the “real world” counterpart of a 
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concept) is lacking. The concept is not matched by an object suitable for description, but 
it is rather a device built and used to capture a particular dimension of the interaction of 
MNEs with the environment wherein they operate, which is an intrinsically problematic 
task. 
A further remark could be added, related to the so-called “language-in-use 
fallacy”(Sartori, 1984:57), that is the difficulty in drawing a precise distinction between 
“scientific” (or at least “technical”) use of the term and its use in common language. In 
fact, this formula seems to describe well the current situation of PR analysis, especially 
if one takes into account the what Jarvis defines the abandonment of “...theory for 
method”(Jarvis 2008:43) starting in 1980s, when scholars apparently stopped trying to 
develop general theories to explain, analyze and predict PR and focused on less 
ambitious, pragmatically-oriented “micro-studies”. 
 
IV. Rules for PR concept-building 
 
As shown in the previous sections, what actually lies behind the term “political 
risk “ is not always clear. This is due to several reasons: for one thing, the 
methodologies adopted by the numerous indices providing country rating (and ranking) 
in terms of potential PR for investors are heterogeneous and not always made explicit 
by the provider. Moreover, in most cases a clear indication of how the concept has been 
“converted” into an index is lacking. Apparently, Sartori’s warning that “concept 
formation stands prior to quantification” has been largely overlooked in the elaboration 
of PR indices. This section aims at proposing a number of explicit rules for concept 
building in political risk, meant to lay the logical foundations for its measurement. 
The study of concepts is of paramount importance for the social scientist. It is 
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not by chance that J.S. Mill devotes the first book of “A system of logic” to “Names and 
Propositions”. In the last decades, starting with the seminal article by Giovanni Sartori 
on “concept misformation in comparative politics” (Sartori, 1970) a rich literature has 
flourished on how (multi-level) concepts are formed in social sciences and how they 
should be formed in order to avoid aberrations such as concept stretching, i.e., 
increasing the extension (or denotation) of a concept as well as increasing, at the same 
time, its intension (or connotation). As well-known, the extension of a concept regards 
its empirical coverage, i.e. the cases to which it applies, while intension regards the 
concept itself, its attributes and qualities. Defining a concept in terms of 
intension/extension requires making reference to the well-known idea of ladder of 
abstraction or ladder of generality. Concepts, in the sense of “central elements of 
propositions” (Sartori, 1970) can be thought of as distributed along a vertical structure. 
The more one ascends such structure, the higher the level of abstraction or generality of 
the concepts. As Sartori points out, there are two ways of climbing up a ladder of 
abstraction: broadening the extension of a concept by diminishing its attributes (which 
means reducing its connotation); or the procedure entailed by conceptual stretching, that 
is extending the extension without diminishing the intension, which inevitably produces 
an obfuscation of the connotation. Therefore, the rule for climbing and descending 
along a ladder of abstraction looks quite plain: there is a continuous trade-off between 
denotation and connotation, that is, going up the ladder, in order to obtain a more 
abstract concept without losing focus, it is not possible to enlarge the 
extension/denotation of a concept (i.e. broadening that concept in terms of empirical 
coverage) without narrowing down its intension/connotation (i.e. reducing its 
attributes). Thus, for instance, taking “democracy” as root concept, “regime” would 
constitute a step upward along the ladder of abstraction (“regime” includes democracy, 
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but also embraces authoritarian, totalitarian regimes and so on), while “presidential 
democracy” would configure a descent along the ladder of abstraction. 
How does all this apply to political risk? As Jarvis rightly pointed out, 
“...Defining political risk proves an elusive task if approached as a deductive-
typological exercise, most obviously because its genealogy is discursive, its 
epistemology situated between disciplines rather than within a singular discipline, and 
because the generative agents of political risk are heterogeneous” (Jarvis 2008 : 1). 
Although it is certainly impossible to deal with PR as with other less 
controversial concepts, some rules can be enunciated and applied to facilitate the task. 
First of all, it can be said that many authors more or less unconsciously apply the ladder 
of abstraction scheme when mentioning, alternatively “political risk” in general 
(pointing to the overall situation of a country) and “political risks” (meaning by this the 
possibility that some specifically individuated events take place – an act of 
expropriation or the nationalization of an entire sector, for example). 
At this point another useful distinction can be mentioned, i.e. the one between 
“kind hierarchies” and “part-whole hierarchies” (Collier & Levitsky, 1997). 
Kind hierarchies are based on the idea that subordinate concepts are a “kind of” 
in relation to the superordinate concepts. Therefore, moving down along the ladder of 
abstraction, a subordinate concept is a “kind of” the superordinate one. Using the 
aforementioned example of democracy, “parliamentary democracy” lies at a lower level 
of abstraction than “democracy” proper. As a matter of fact, adding or subtracting 
adjectives represents a very common way of moving along the ladder of generality. The 
subordinate concept, in a kind hierarchy, features all of the attributes of the 
superordinate one, plus one or more which necessarily limit its empirical coverage 
compared to the one of the concept lying at the higher level of abstraction. 
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In part-whole hierarchies, instead, the superordinate concept is thought of as a 
whole, and the subordinate concept as a component or a part of it. In this sense, for 
example, if we consider a procedural, empirical concept of democracy as presenting the 
following four basic features: (a) universal suffrage, both male and female; (b) free, 
competitive, recurrent, and fair elections; (c) more than one party; (d) different and 
alternative media sources ( see Morlino, 2011, ch. 3), it is possible to notice how each 
feature constitutes a different concept (in the context of the multi-level concept of 
“democracy”) . However, all of the concepts, can be virtually “located” at a lower level 
of abstraction with respect to the overarching category of “democracy”. 
The relevance of the part-whole hierarchy scheme to PR is evident. As already 
said, the origins of political risk as a social science concept lie in the development of 
systems to assess country risk as an overarching concept. However, even here a 
distinction should be added: in spite of the recognition of the relevance of the political 
aspects of country risk, which have started to be assessed independently of purely 
economic indicators, for the sake of clarity the origins of the concept and its usage need 
to be recalled. PR in this sense should be thought of as a component of country risk, 
according to the scheme illustrated in figure 3.1. 
Having in mind the concept of PR and taking stock of its peculiarities, another 
point is worth stressing. In a well-known work of 1984, Sartori draws up a number of 
“guidelines for concept analysis” (Sartori 1984). The starting point is a triangular 
scheme, that the author borrows from Ogden and Richards (1946). The relationship 
between the knowing and the known is broken down into three elements: term, meaning 
and referent. 
The term is the word we use to refer to something; the meaning is essentially the 
connotation, or intension, pertaining to the term; the referent is the “object” , or “real-
66 
 
world counterpart” of the term. The problem when dealing with a concept such as PR is 
evident: how to treat a concept whose referent, assuming that it exists, is so fuzzy? How 
to circumvent, in our conceptual strategy, what can be defined as “reification, 
essentialism, and instrumentalist view of language” (Bevin & Kedar, 2008)? The task is 
not easy at all, because the concept of risk itself entails a strong and inescapable 
subjective component, i.e., risk is such as it is “perceived” and “weighted” by someone. 
The goal of transforming risk in a “measurable substance” is evidently impossible to 
attain. However, as will be shown in the next sections, by proceeding step by step and 
always justifying and clarifying the choices made, it is possible to lay the foundations 
for an acceptable conceptualization, operationalization and consistent measurement of 
political risk, making pragmatic choices without disregarding the guidance of theory. 
 
Figure 3.1: PR and part-whole hierarchy 
 
 
Outlining the conceptual approach that will be adopted is of paramount 
importance, as it will obviously cascade down into the operationalization and indexation 
processes. 
Most PR indices assume a pragmatic approach, but as every social scientist 
knows, any index is nothing but a model in which causal assumptions are embedded. 
Indices of PR are supposed to contain snapshot information on countries, but their 
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essential purpose is predictive, not merely diagnostic, as they entail causal assumptions, 
for instance, about what makes a political regime more or less stable or more or less 
likely to enforce property rights for foreign investors. 
In his seminal work on social science concepts, Goertz (2006) distinguishes 
between the so-called factor-analytic approach and what he calls “ontological, realist 
and causal” approach. The first approach aims at measuring an abstract concept (e.g. 
“intelligence”) by making inferences about its external manifestation ( e.g. the ability to 
carry out a certain task in a certain time). The causal relationship then is as a top-down 
one: the abstract concept manifests itself in a number of ways which can be translated 
into variables to be measured as “symptoms” of the concept itself. The concept of 
“legitimacy” can be taken as an example of the possible resort to “effect”, substitutable 
variables: legitimacy could be measured, for instance, by recurring to the size of a 
state’s secret police that aims to crush dissenters (Gilley 2006: 504). The second 
approach, the one adopted by Goertz, is ontological in that the sub-dimensions of the 
concept are substantial (e.g. free, fair and competitive elections are constitutive of 
democracy, not a “symptom” thereof), realist in that it is not purely semantic, but 
involves an empirical analysis of the concept referred to by the word, and causal in that 
it looks at the causal relationship between ontological attributes and causal hypotheses, 
explanations, mechanisms. According to this approach, causality could be described as 
following a bi-directional pattern, because attributes influence and are in turn influenced 
by the overarching concept. None of these two approaches seems to be fit for PR 
analysis. The causal direction in this case is reversed, as illustrated in figure 3. As 
already said, PR is a latent variable: it cannot be measured directly, therefore other 
variables need to be chosen in order to measure it. In this respect,particular attention 
should be paid to the nature of the relationship between those variables, or dimensions, 
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and the concept itself. Bollen and Lennox (1991:305) distinguish between “indicators 
that influence, and those influenced by, latent variables”. 
 
 Figure 3.2- Direction of concept-dimensions causal relationship 
 
Concept and measures of political risk cannot but adopt the first, “causal” 
approach: PR as a construct necessarily incorporates a number of causal propositions 
with predictive purposes. Drawing on the analysis conducted, some rules for PR 
concept-building can be enunciated: 
 
1. When dealing with PR, a part-whole hierarchy approach is to be 
preferred to classic, Aristotelian kind-hierarchy. 
2. PR can be thought of as a “three level concept”, with a basic level, a 
secondary level (dimensions) and an indicator/data level. 
3. In order to build consistent and reliable measurement techniques for PR, 
special attention should be paid to the relationship between the basic and the secondary 
level of the concept. 
4. Such relationship should be conceptualized as a causal one, and its 
direction as being a“bottom-up one”, configuring a model in which the dimensions are 
the explicative variables, and political risk the explained one. 
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To the task of proposing a definition of political risk we turn now, anticipating 
that the biggest challenges will be i) to justify theoretically and empirically the choice of 
PR dimensions and ii) to provide evidence supporting the hypothesis that the model 
including the variables chosen has predictive value, and that can achieve the goal of 
explaining “more with less” with respect to other indices. 
 
V. Empirical definition and operationalization 
 
Why do we need an explicit definition of political risk from the point of view of 
the political regime, and why is it worth trying to build a tool for assessing it, which be 
theoretically and empirically justifiable? As already pointed out, the trend nowadays is 
towards a pragmatic approach to political risk assessment, focusing on the point of view 
of the individual international investor. It is certainly true that circumstances which 
represent risk for an investor can be an opportunity for another one. In order to assess 
the firm- specific risk profile of a country, analyses need to be performed at the firm-
level. Nonetheless, it is also true that “generalist” country risk ratings can (and in fact 
often do) provide important guidance for economic operators (especially small and 
medium-sized enterprises, most of which do not have an in-house political risk analysis 
division) in investment decisions, at least at an initial stage. 
Another point can be added to argue in favor of the theoretical and practical 
relevance of generalist approaches to political risk ratings: both elements of political 
risk as it is defined here (see below), i.e. the probability of unexpected and radical 
political change and/or of the violation of the investor's property rights, inevitably affect 
the business environment of a country, regardless of the industry, as shown by the 
approach adopted, for instance, by the Italian export credit agency SACE. In its 2012 
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country risk map, SACE proposes an industry-specific approach to risk assessment. 
Four different categories of investors are individuated
43
 along with three different 
categories of risk. However, the two risks which approximately reflect PR as treated 
here, that is, “political violence” and “political-normative risk” are deemed relevant in 
this model for any typology of investor, supporting the view expressed here that a 
generalist approach to PR is conceptually and practically relevant. Such position seems 
plausible also in light of the need to find a balance between the point of view of the 
individual investor and the overall institutional-political situation of a country, in order 
to make comparisons across countries and to build reliable and transparent ranking 
systems. 
That said, PR can be defined as follows: the probability that the profitability of 
an investment be negatively affected by circumstances ascribable either to the inability 
of the political system to absorb shocks of internal/external origin, or to the possible 
violation of the international investor's property rights. 
We argue that the concept of political risk can be accordingly operationalized 
taking into account two main dimensions: political stability and the rule of law. 
 By political stability here we mean the absence of domestic civil conflict and 
violent behavior and of structural political change (see Hurwitz 1973). The reverse side 
of political stability, i.e. political instability, is often confused with political risk proper. 
However, as should be clear at this point, what we argue here is that political instability 
is causally linked to, but does not coincide with, political risk. The operationalization of 
the political stability component hinges on five main sub-dimensions: i) Human 
Development ii) Inequality iii) Political Legitimacy iv) Constraints to Responsiveness 
                                                          
43
The four categories are: Bank, Construction Company, Exporter, Investor. See 
http://www.sace.it/GruppoSACE/content/it/consumer/research/country_info/ 
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v) International/Regional Integration. The choice of indicators for each sub-dimension 
is summarized in Annex I, which reproduces the codebook for the data set created to the 
purposes of this inquiry. For Human Development, we use the UNDP Human 
Development Index (HDI), with an important caveat: since inequality is an important 
dimension of human development, as recently recognized by the UNDP itself with the 
introduction of the Inequality-adjusted HDI
44
, we also opted for including the Gini 
Index score for the selected countries. An inverse relationship is posited between human 
development and political risk (the higher a country's HDI score, the lower the level of 
PR). The sub-dimension of Political Legitimacy defines an aspect of political regimes 
which lays aside purely normative concerns to capture the empirical datum of (the 
absence, or presence of) widespread popular support for a given regime. In this sense, a 
polity like Russia, for instance, though it can be classified at best as a “hybrid regime”, 
is characterized by a high level of political legitimacy (see the legit score for 2009 
included in Annex I). Constraints to Responsiveness draws from the analogous sub-
dimension included in the TODEM data set developed by Morlino and Quaranta (2011). 
While in the original version the sub-dimension is part of a tool designed to assess the 
quality of democracy, the narrower notion adopted here configures the economic 
constraints that governments (be they democratic or not) encounter in meeting the 
requests of their citizens. It is operationalized by recurring to a standardized (1-10) 
measure of the stock of public debt of the countries considered. Low constraints to 
responsiveness, for instance, seem to have played a role in helping the Algerian 
government contain the protests that instead brought about abrupt political change in 
                                                          
44
Inequality-adjusted HDI is only available starting from 2011, thus it could be used for future research. 
Here we adjust HDI with inequality simply factoring into the PR index a 1-10 standardized Gini index 
score for each country considered. 
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other countries over 2011.  
The rule of law, a multifaceted concept in itself, lies at the heart of many 
scholarly endeavors aiming at defining it both in normative and empirical terms. The 
rule of law is not only the enforcement of legal norms. It also connotes the principle of 
the supremacy of law, that is, the Ciceronian legum servi sumus, and entails at least the 
capacity, even if limited, to make authorities respect the laws, and to have laws that are 
non-retroactive, publicly known, universal, stable, and unambiguous. Drawing from 
previous research (see in particular Morlino 2011), an empirical definition of rule of law 
is proposed here, focusing on those aspects which are more likely to have an impact on 
the activities of foreign investors. Six main sub-dimensions are individuated: i) Civil 
Order ii) Property Rights iii) Administrative Capacity iv) Integrity v) Military 
Interference vi) Effective Constraints on the Executive. A seventh sub-dimension of the 
rule of law is added to account for the “international” side to PR . 
The Civil Order sub-dimension focuses on individual security and civil order, in 
terms of the right to life, freedom from fear and the threat of torture, personal security, 
and the right to own property guaranteed and protected throughout the country. We 
chose to operationalize it recurring to the Cingranelli and Richards Physical Integrity 
Index (Cingranelli and Richards 1999), an additive index constructed from the CIRI 
Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance indicators. 
The sub-dimension labeled “property rights” incorporates into our political risk index a 
crucial aspect of the rule of law, particularly salient in the assessment of direct 
investment riskiness. The relevant indicator in this case is the Protection of Property 
Rights component of the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World Index 
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(EFWI)
45
. We use data drawn from the same data set also to operationalize the fifth sub-
dimension, i.e. military interference in the political process. The selected indicator is the 
EFWI component labeled “military interference in the rule of law and in the political 
process”.  
The Integrity sub-dimension accounts for the level of corruption present in the 
countries considered. The chosen indicator is Transparency International's Corruption 
Perceptions Index, an index which ranks countries according to the perceived level of 
public-sector corruption. The index draws on various assessments and business opinion 
surveys, carried out by independent and reputable institutions. A sub-dimension named 
Constraints on the Executive is also included, building on the empirical results of the 
study carried out by Jensen (2008), who found a relevant and statistically significant 
relationship between higher constraints on the executives of the countries analyzed and 
lower levels of political risk. The source of data on executive constraints is the Polity IV 
project
46
. Finally, a sub-dimension is identified to measure the international dimension 
of risk. In the last years, a rich literature has flourished on the impact of the so-called 
“Bilateral Investment Treaties” (BITs) on foreign direct investment. These are 
agreements concluded between two countries in order to guarantee the investors’ 
substantive rights and to allow for arbitration of any disputes that may arise. There is no 
agreement about the positive impact of BITs and the inflow of FDI. However, numerous 
studies on the subject suggest the existence of a negative relationship between the 
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The source of this component is the Global Competitiveness Report question: “Property rights, 
including over financial assets, are poorly defined and not protected by law (= 1) or are clearly defined 
and well protected by law (= 7).” 
46
 “Operationally, this variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making  
powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any 
"accountability groups." In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of 
accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisors in 
monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and in many states a strong, independent judiciary. The 
concern is therefore with the checks and balances between the various  parts of the decision-making 
process. A seven-category scale is used” (Polity IV data set user's Manual 2011, p. 24) 
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stipulation of BITs and perceived risk
47
. Besides signaling the will of the host country to 
protect the foreign investor’s property rights, the existence of BITs reduces uncertainty 
because disputes emerging from BITs are mostly taken before the ICSID, which 
disseminates information about the behavior of the host country (see Allee and 
Peinhardt 2011:402). The number of BITs concluded and enforced by a country could 
be considered at least to some extent as an indicator of the level of integration of that 
particular country in the world economy, which in turn can be considered to be an 
element enhancing political stability. 
In light of the above, a risk indicator was built starting from two components: 
one was created coding data on BITs by UNCTAD and the International Center for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and accounts for the total number of BITs 
in force for each country. The other is the “Rule of law” score from the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators data set, covering all of the countries of interest and 
measuring the quality of contract enforcement and property rights. The first component 
was multiplied by the second. The logic behind the aggregation rule chosen is that, 
although it certainly captures a facet of the integration of a country in the world 
economy, the number of BITs stipulated by a certain country is not sufficient as an 
indicator of the likelihood that the foreign investor’s rights are enforced in that 
particular country. In order for these rights to be protected, not only a BIT has to be in 
place, but its provisions have to be implemented by national authorities.  
 Three issues need to be shortly addressed at this point, aiming as we do at 
providing a theoretically justified and transparent measurement technique (on the 
problem of conceptualization in relation to measurement, see Munck 2009: 13-37) : i) 
                                                          
47
 See for instance Neumayer  and Spess 2005, Bubb and Rose-Acherman 2007, Berger et al. 2010. Tobin 
(2010) finds that when countries have “the necessary domestic institutions in place that interact with BITs 
to make these international commitments credible and valuable to investors”, BITs have a positive impact 
on the investment inflow because they reduce risk. 
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the specification of the meaning of the concept of political risk through the 
identification of attributes that vary in terms of their level of abstractness ii) the 
outcome of the subsequent process of disaggregation, which automatically raises the 
question of how the disaggregated data might be aggregated iii) the question of whether 
or not to attribute weights to our explanatory variables, and of justifying the weighting 
scheme adopted. The first problem was tackled in § 2-4, but for clarity's sake it is timely 
to recall the solution proposed. Our hypothesis is that political risk as defined here can 
be brought back to two dimensions: political stability and the rule of law. Such 
dimensions are clearly intertwined, but for analytical purposes we choose to locate them 
at the same level of abstraction because we do not wish to posit a causal hierarchy 
between them (i.e. taking individual countries as units of analysis, does political 
stability determine the rule of law, or is rather the rule of law which determines the level 
of political stability?). This is the rationale for the aggregation rule chosen, that is 
addition both at an aggregated (inter-dimensional) and disaggregated (intra-
dimensional) level. Indeed, it cannot be excluded that future research highlight 
interaction effects between sub-components, which would justify the choice of a 
different aggregation rule (such as multiplication). Coming to the third problem, we 
deemed not possible at this stage of the research to attribute different weights to 
components. 
In the next sections we conduct a comparison between the country ranking we 
obtained (stressing, once again, that it refers to year 2010, right before the Arab Spring) 
and the ones proposed by two different institutions operating in the field of political 
risk: the Economist Intelligence Unit and the Belgian Office National Du Ducroire. 
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VI. Comparing rankings: comments and suggestions for further 
research 
 
The main purposes of the previous chapter were to conduct an exploratory 
analysis of PR country rankings against the backdrop of the Arab Spring, highlighting 
the most blatant shortcomings of the existing methods and offering some suggestions 
for improving them further research in the field of political risk analysis. Here we take a 
step further by proposing an alternative conceptualization and measurement of political 
risk. The events which took place in the Arab world starting from January 2011 
certainly offer food for thought in this respect, thus our PR index was built using 
secondary data from 2009 (lagged one year with respect to the Arab Spring in order to 
avoid the problem of endogeneity, i.e., causation running in the direction from explained 
to explanatory variable rather than vice-versa).  
A twofold index ranging from 0 (minimum risk) to 10 was created and two 
comparisons were carried out, one between the political stability component of the 
index with the ranking provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the other 
between the full PR index produced and the ONDD ranking. The exploratory 
comparison covers 55 countries from Western and Eastern Europe and the MENA 
region. The three indices
48 
evidently adopt different methodologies and different scoring 
systems, in which the use of both quantitative data and qualitative judgment are 
involved. A possible objection to such an endeavor might be that it does not make sense 
to compare figures obtained through such diverse conceptual schemes. To this we 
respond by saying that rather than the scores in themselves, the very subject of the 
comparison here is the country ranking produced by the assessment systems. Moreover, 
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 We apply this label also to ONDD ranking system, even though  the actual figures accounting for the 
sub-components used by the Office National are not at our disposal, so that the ONDD should be referred 
to as  a “categorization” or “ranking system” rather than an index stricto sensu 
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the ranking itself, if confronted with the largely unexpected events of the Arab Spring, is 
quite telling with respect to the validity of the model adopted to build it. As regards the 
ONDD, while it accepted to provide the historic classifications needed for carrying out 
this comparative analysis, it did not disclose the details of the model used to obtain its 
ranking system. As a consequence, it is not possible here to discuss its approach. This 
clearly epitomizes the lack of transparency that inevitably hinders the efforts in making 
comparisons across different assessment approaches in this field. 
 
   Table 3.1: Political Stability rankings compared 
# Country IndexPRps 2010 # Country EIU 2010 
1 Egypt 5,6 1 Ukraine 7,6 
2 Azerbaijan 5,1 2 Bosnia 7,5 
3 Turkey 5,0 3 Moldova 7,5 
4 Israel 4,9 4 Turkey 6,8 
5 Moldova 4,6 5 Estonia 6,7 
6 Yemen 4,4 6 Latvia 6,7 
7 Jordan 4,4 7 Algeria 6,6 
8 Cyprus 4,4 8 Macedonia 6,6 
9 Bosnia 4,4 9 Russia 6,5 
10 Algeria 4,3 10 Montenegro 6,4 
11 Tunisia 4,2 11 Romania 6,4 
12 Belgium 4,1 12 Serbia 6,4 
13 Georgia 3,9 13 Georgia 6,3 
14 Syria 3,9 14 Greece 6,3 
15 Iran 3,8 15 Albania 6,2 
 
Sources: EIU, ONDD, the World Bank, CIA Factbook, Transparency International, Polity IV Project, 
CIRI data set, the Fraser Institute (see References) 
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Fortunately, the same does not apply to the EIU, which provides a quite detailed 
description of the methodology used to obtain the ranking reproduced in Table 3.1, 
enabling us to make a few remarks on the subject. 
The EIU “Political Instability Index” seeks to identify and quantify the main 
social, economic and political factors that are causally associated with political 
instability. The model factors in the level of development as measured by the infant 
mortality rate; extreme cases of economic or political discrimination against minorities; 
"a bad neighbourhood"; the regime type; inequality; a prior history of instability; ethnic 
fragmentation; poor governance; a proclivity to labour unrest; the level of provision of 
public services and state strength, as well as indicators accounting for economic 
distress. The EIU scoring system for sub-components is reproduced in Annex II. 
Table 3.2 provides a comparison of the rankings obtained according to the three 
different approaches under examination. In this respect, some remarks can be made. The 
first is that Tunisia does not appear in the riskiest “top ten” neither in the EIU nor in the 
ONDD ranking. This is an interesting outcome. It is so first and foremost in light of the 
well-known fact that Tunisia is the country where the 2010-11 revolts started, spreading 
soon to the rest of the Middle-East.  
Secondly, as shown in Annex III, which reproduces the whole EIU ranking, 
Tunisia scored better than Italy for political stability. This result is telling in itself, and it 
seems to suggest that either the methodology used is flawed, or, perhaps, that too many 
components are factored into the index, so that the truly relevant ones are offset by 
other, less relevant ones. As for the methodology used by the EIU, a few points should 
be recalled
49
: first of all, perhaps the “bad neighbourhood” approach to the “external” 
dimension of political stability is not the most appropriate to the purposes of assessing 
                                                          
49
For a more complete critique of  the EIU's approach, see supra ch. 2 
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political risk. Instances can easily be found of countries which are relatively stable 
although the geopolitical context they belong to is not. 
 
Table 3.2 Political Risk rankings compared 
# Country IndexPR 2010 # Country ONDD 2010 
1 Azerbaijan 5,8 1 Iran 6 
2 Egypt 5,8 2 Georgia 5 
3 Syria 5,3 3 Israel 4 
4 Turkey 5,0 4 Syria 4 
5 Iran 5,0 5 Algeria 3 
6 Algeria 4,9 6 Azerbaijan 3 
7 Moldova 4,8 7 Egypt 3 
8 Tunisia 4,7 8 Macedonia 3 
9 Jordan 4,7 9 Moldova 3 
10 Georgia 4,6 10 Morocco 3 
11 Israel 4,6 11 Russia 3 
12 Ukraine 4,6 12 Serbia 3 
13 Morocco 4,1 13 Turkey 3 
 
Sources: EIU, ONDD, the World Bank, CIA Factbook, Transparency International, Polity IV Project, 
CIRI data set, the Fraser Institute (see References) 
 
Second, in assessing the component “Regime type”, the EIU equates democratic 
regimes with authoritarian ones. This approach seems indeed questionable, also (but not 
only) in light of the Arab Spring. On the other hand, the salience of political regimes 
and institutions as determinants of prosperity and poverty should (and indeed start to) 
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receive today renewed attention from practitioners and scholars
50
 . 
It is possible to draw some conclusions from what observed so far. First of all, in 
order to get rid of conceptual confusion (which can originate errors of measurement), a 
more rigorous approach to concept-building should be applied to political risk. Second, 
the two ranking systems examined here seem to perform poorly in terms of predictive 
power compared to the index we propose. As a matter of fact, neither in the ONDD nor 
in the EIU ranking for 2010 does Tunisia appear in the risk “top ten”. Third, once again, 
normative claims about the relationship between political regimes and political stability 
are embedded – but not always made explicit – in virtually any model for assessing 
political risk for investment. Thus, much more attention should be paid to those claims 
in the phase of index-building, because, recalling once again Sartori's famous warning, 
“concept formation stands prior to quantification”. In particular, such claims should 
ideally be subject to empirical testing or should be backed by existing empirical studies, 
at least to some extent. 
Finally, we argue that if these recommendations are implemented, it should be 
easier to single out and measure those variables which are actually more likely to hinder 
political stability and/or the rule of law, with adverse consequences on the profitability 
of foreign investments. The Arab Spring provided us with the occasion of observing the 
shortcomings of the existing political risk assessment systems. Of this occasion we 
should take advantage, as the problem with “assessing political risk assessment” is 
exactly the lack of data on actual losses incurred by companies for reasons that can be 
brought back to political risk as defined here.  
  
                                                          
50
See for instance the recent volume by Acemoglu and Robinson. “Why Nations Fail- the Origins of 
Power, Prosperity and Poverty”, which stresses  the importance of political institutions as determinants of 
well-being and eventually of political stability 
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Chapter 4 
The Role of Expert Judgment 
 
An expert is someone who knows some of the worst mistakes that can be made in his 
subject, and how to avoid them.  
(W. Heisenberg) 
 
I.   Introduction  
 
The role of expert judgment as a major source of intelligence in PR analysis has 
periodically emerged in the previous chapters. However, due to its relevance and its 
cross-cutting nature with respect to the whole body of knowledge related to political risk 
analysis, this subject deserves separate attention. 
 Contrary to what happens in the natural world, scholars studying the realm of 
social sciences often have to confront the problem of how to operationalize extremely 
abstract concepts, which lack a concrete counterpart in the physical world.  
It is definitely difficult – yet in many respects indispensable – to translate abstract 
ideas such as “freedom”, “legitimacy”, “democracy”, “representativeness” into a 
measurable “substance”, and to do so rigorously and convincingly. However, when it 
comes to measuring soft variables, often the only option available is to rely on expert 
judgment. But what do we mean by “human judgment”, what are its boundaries and 
potentialities? What exactly is “expertise”? When it comes to producing political data, are 
experts better than non-experts? Is there a way to overcome the bias that affect human 
reasoning to obtain better forecasts? The following sections will try to address these 
crucial questions. 
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II.  Human Judgment in PR analysis as decision making under risk 
 
If we want to understand the functioning and shortcomings of human judgment as 
a source of political knowledge (and forecasts) it is indispensable to start from a review 
of the literature on decision making under risk: as Daniel Kahneman stated in his Nobel 
Prize lecture, the psychology of judgment and the psychology of choice share the same 
principles (Kahneman 2002:483). 
For a long time, the study of human decision making has been dominated by the 
so-called expected utility theory (EUT). According to the EUT there is a limited number 
of actions that the individual can undertake, each of which leads to a given outcome. The 
individual also has preferences with respect to the possible outcomes of her actions, 
based on which (and based also on the existing constraints) she decides upon a particular 
action. In other words, the EUT states that “the decision maker (DM) chooses between 
risky or uncertain prospects by comparing their expected utility values, i.e., the weighted 
sums obtained by adding the utility values of outcomes multiplied by their respective 
probabilities” (Mongin 1997:342). In this sense, the decision is the outcome of an activity 
of calculation. Apparently, the EUT is highly normative, i.e. it prescribes what individuals 
have to do in order to reach their objectives. However, there were also attempts at 
developing a positive theory of choice based on the conception of the individual as a 
rational decision-maker and on the assumptions underlying the EUT – a prominent 
example thereof being Friedman (1953) who holds that those actors who do not “play by 
the rules” of rational choice will be gradually excluded thanks to a process of “natural 
selection”. 
Although the EUT encountered several criticisms over time (e.g. by Allais 1953 
and Schumpeter 1954), the definitive empirical proof and systematization of its 
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shortcomings as a descriptive theory of decision making under risk was carried out by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1986). 
The rational choice approach to decision making rests on four main assumptions 
or rules (Kahneman and Tversky 1986): 1) Cancellation 2) Transitivity 3) Dominance 4) 
Invariance. Cancellation means that any state of the world which produces the same 
outcome of the actor’s choice is canceled by definition. Transitivity means that when the 
utility attached to option A is greater than the utility attached to option B, then A is 
preferred to B (in order for this assumption to hold the value of each option must not 
depend on the value of any other option available). Dominance simply means that if 
option A is equal to option B in all states and better than option B in at least one state, 
then A must be preferred to B. Finally, according to the invariance rule, different 
presentations of the identical choice problem should yield identical preferences. 
Appealing and logically robust as these axioms may look in normative terms, they are 
systematically violated when human judgment is required to make decisions under 
conditions of risk, i.e. when we move from the normative to the positive level. 
One interesting example is the famous “Asian Disease” experiment (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1986:260). The problem was framed as follows (the numbers between 
parentheses refer to the percentage of respondents who chose the preceding option): 
 
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian 
disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to 
combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific 
estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows:  
 
- If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. [72%]  
- If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be 
saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved. [28%]  
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When a similar sample was presented with the same problem, this time framed in 
terms of number of casualties rather than of lives saved, the results were 
completely different: 
 
If Program C is adopted 400 people will die. [22%]  
If Program D is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die,  
and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die. [78%] 
 
Experiments like the one described show that the axiom of invariability does not 
stand the test of reality, and as a consequence the EUT theory does not provide a valid 
description of human decision making under conditions of risk. 
This and other findings lead the authors to the formulation of the so-called prospect 
theory. According to prospect theory, “(…) value is assigned to gains and losses rather 
than to final assets and in which probabilities are replaced by decision weights” 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979:263). 
The salience of prospect theory to PR analysis as a field of inquiry is evident, as 
it sheds light on a number of issues related to PR assessment (see for instance 
McDermott 1992, who uses prospect theory to explain decision making by the US 
president and advisers in the case of the 1979 Iranian hostage rescue mission). 
In sum, when making judgments, the human mind is inevitably exposed to a 
number of biases (See Table 4.1 below). This happens because it is not equipped to 
“think statistically”51. In fact, resorting to a consolidated taxonomy in clinic 
psychology, its functioning can be described as “a tale of two systems” (Kahneman 
2011). “ System 1” configures an intuitive mode in which judgments and decisions are 
made in a fast and automatic fashion, while “System 2” constitutes a controlled mode, 
in which decisions are taken deliberately and slowly. While the intuitive System 1 
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 As Tversky and Kahneman showed in their first work together, systematic errors were present also in 
causal judgments made by statistically trained researchers. 
85 
 
carries out most operations successfully, it is subject to biases which most of the time 
are impossible to avoid, even if the more “controlling” System 2 is activated to perform 
this task.  
 
Table 4.1 : Heuristics and biases in human decision making  
Heuristics Description Biases 
 
Representativeness 
 
“Probabilities are 
evaluated by the degree to 
which A resembles B”, e.g. 
when A is highly 
representative of B, the 
probability that A 
originates from B is judged 
to be high” 
 
 Insensitivity to prior 
probability of outcomes 
 Insensitivity to sample 
size 
 Misconception of 
chance 
 Insensitivity to 
predictability 
 The illusion of validity 
 Misconceptions of 
regression 
 
Availability 
 
“There are situations in 
which people assess the 
frequency of a class or the 
probability of an event by 
the ease with which 
instances or occurrences 
can be brought to mind” 
 
 Biases due to the 
retrievability of 
instances 
 Biases due to the 
effectiveness of a 
search set 
 Biases of imaginability 
 Illusory correlation 
 
Adjustment & Anchoring 
 
“In many situations, 
people make estimates by 
starting from an initial 
value that is adjusted to 
yield the final answer (…) 
different starting points 
yield different estimates, 
which are biased toward 
the initial values.” 
 
 
 Insufficient adjustment  
 Biases in the evaluation 
of conjunctive and 
disjunctive events 
 Anchoring in the 
assessment of 
subjective probability 
distributions 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Kahneman and Tversky 1984  
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Much more could be said about the way in which System 1 and System 2 
interact, but to the purposes of the present treatise of the subject suffice it to conclude 
that human judgment is inevitably affected by systematic error when it is produced 
under conditions of risk.  At this point, a further question arises. Given such limitations 
of human judgment, can “expertise” actually play a role in producing better judgments 
(and thus better forecasts)? Before trying to answer such question, it is necessary to 
clarify what expertise is. 
 
III.   Expert Judgment and “subjective measures” of political variables 
 
In academic discourse, the concept of “expertise” may assume two different 
meanings. First and foremost, when talking about “experts” we may refer to area or 
country specialists, i.e. individuals who possess in-depth knowledge of a given 
country’s politics, history, culture, law, economics, language (Howell 1986:51). 
Second, as we shall soon see, from the point of view of psychology the notion of 
expertise is rather connected to the ability to process information to provide forecasts. 
In the first sense, expertise plays a role in the quality of the analyst’s judgment 
because it influences the accessibility of relevant information (e.g. in the case of the 
area expert who speaks the local language of a given country, thus having access to all 
available sources of information). When it comes to this first meaning of expertise, 
there is little doubt that “experts” are potentially better equipped than non-experts for 
acquiring and consequently processing information. As will be explained below, as far 
as the second meaning of expertise is concerned things are different. However, before 
moving to this issue, it is timely to exemplify the problems encountered by those who 
have tried to assess the performance of experts. 
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In fact, although PR ratings often rely on expert judgment to produce 
intelligence, and in spite of the fact that the same happens for a number of measurement 
operations in the social science (as in the case of democracy or freedoms), the literature 
devoted to assessing the diagnostic/predictive performance of expert judgment in terms 
of accuracy is scant. One of the rare contributions in this sense is the one by Bollen and 
Paxton (2000), which builds on previous work by Bollen (1993) and Bollen and 
Grandjean (1981) .  
The authors examine judge-specific errors of measurement by looking at the 
work of three judges assessing democracy over a period of 17 years (1972-1988). 
According to their findings, error in judgment-based measurement (which they 
summarize as “method factor”) can be ascribed to three possible sources: a) the 
information available for rating; b) the judges’ processing of this information; and c) the 
method by which a judge’s processing decisions are translated into a rating (Bollen and 
Paxton 2000:62). In focusing on the second aspect, i.e. on the way in which judges 
process information, Bollen and Paxton regress the standardized scores assigned to 
various countries by three experts measuring the quality of democracy in 1980 on three 
sets of variables , i.e. situational closeness, defensive attribution, and information, in 
order to assess the impact of various features of countries on the judge’s method factors. 
Their results are reproduced below (see Table 2.2 where a positive coefficient indicates 
the tendency of the judge to overrate countries, a negative one to the contrary indicates 
the tendency to underrate them). The authors interpret the results obtained in the sense 
that, for instance, Gastil tends to underrate marxist-leninist countries and to overrate 
catholic countries, while Banks shows a “positive bias” towards Marxist-leninist 
countries. Sussman’s results are similar to Gastil’s, and according to the authors this can 
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be partially explained by the fact that the two experts worked for a while for the same 
institution (namely the Freedom House). 
 The analysis conducted by Bollen and Paxton is certainly sophisticated and 
compelling from the statistical point of view, and its results seem to be credible 
(especially in light of the relevant literature reviewed infra) in the sense that they 
confirm the existence of a“human factor” in expert-produced political data. Yet, they 
could be subject to criticism in at least one respect: what if Gastil was right in deeming 
the countries classified as “catholic” more democratic than the “Marxist-leninist” ones? 
While the regression coefficients reproduced above are quite telling with respect to the 
“assessment style” of the judges considered, in absence of an “objective” measure of 
democracy we cannot determine whether Gastil (or Banks) was right or not.  
In any case, a conclusion we can certainly draw from what said so far is that the 
human mind is not able to think “statistically”. This aspect becomes particularly salient 
when the mission of the judgment activity is estimating the likelihood of events. Thus, 
irrespective of her knowledge in the relevant field of analysis, it is not possible for a 
judge to make decisions based on a framework of objective probability, meant as long-
term relative frequency of a given outcome in an experimental context (the typical and 
most banal example of which is tossing a coin N times), or to recall a mathematic 
definition, meant as a “limiting relative frequency: the long-run behavior of a 
nondeterministic outcome or just an observed proportion in a population” (Gill 
2006:285). Evidently, what comes to the fore in PR analysis is not objective probability, 
but rather subjective probability, which denotes “any estimate of the probability of an 
event, which is given by a subject, or inferred from his behavior. These estimates are 
not assumed to satisfy any axioms or consistency requirements” (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1972: 431). 
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Table 4.2 - “Method factor” for judges assessing democracy in 1980 
 
 Source: Bollen and Paxton (2000:75) 
In fact, the concept of “expertise” in itself conjures the idea that if the judge is an 
“expert”, then her intuitions (based on subjective probability calculation52) will be more 
reliable than if the judge were a “non-expert”. But is it really so? In order to answer this 
                                                          
52 The notion of subjective probability is closely linked to the  Bayesian approach to probability, 
which postulates “(…)a `prior probability' model that describes a modeler's initial uncertainty 
about parameters, a likelihood function that describes the distribution of data, given that a  
parameter holds a specific value, and Bayes'rule, which provides a coherent method of updating 
beliefs about uncertainty when data becomes available (Chicks 2005:225) 
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question, we need to delve more in-depth into the second definition of forecasting 
expertise as hinted at above. 
There are two main approaches to the assessment of intuition and expertise in 
psychology: naturalistic decision making (NDM) and heuristics and biases (HB). The 
first approach hinges on the successes of expert intuition vis-à-vis formalized 
algorithms. It frames expertise in terms of “history of successful outcomes” [rather than 
of] quantitative performance measures” (Kahneman and Klein 2009:519).  
 The second approach instead focuses on the biases and shortcomings of judges 
(some instances of which were illustrated above). Its understanding of expertise is based 
on the comparison between the accuracy of experts’ decisions and the performance of 
“optimal linear combinations” (Kahneman and Klein 2009:519). 
A prominent example of this approach is the renowned work on expert political 
judgment by Tetlock (2005). Building on the results of experiments conducted over 
fifteen years, Tetlock shows how highly educated experts were not able to outperform 
untrained forecasters in predicting long-term socio-political events.  
Although they differ in many aspects (from the advantage point chosen to the 
very vocabulary they adopt), the two approaches described converge in at least three 
respects: first, in pointing out that the validity of experts’ judgments can be easily 
hindered by “subjective (over)confidence” which is not necessarily substantiated by 
facts; second, in acknowledging that the reliability of intuitive judgment largely 
depends on the type of environment in which the judgment itself is made (if clinical 
sciences are to be considered “high-validity” environments, the political world as 
already hinted at above is considered to the contrary a “low-validity” environment); 
third, in recognizing the potential benefits of mixed or “semi-formal” strategies in 
coping with overconfidence and improving the outcome of decision-making processes 
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(Kahneman and Klein 2009:524). An example of semi-formal strategy is the 
“premortem method” (Klein 2007:18) based on a simple yet effective stratagem, i.e. 
structuring the analysis of a certain crisis scenario assuming that it already took place 
and the analysts have to list the reasons why it happened. This suggests that one 
possible way to build on the strengths of skilled PR forecasters is to recur to structured 
decision-making techniques, to other examples of which we turn now. 
 
IV.   Looking for a middle ground? Learning to think “causal” 
 
The objective of the previous sections was to illustrate the main limitations to 
human and expert judgment, in particular as regards decision-making in a framework of 
risk. This section will take up the question whether and how it is possible (once those 
limits are acknowledged and duly taken into account) to improve the quality of expert 
judgment recurring to structured analysis techniques and in particular to the so-called 
Explicit Causal Modeling (ECM). 
One of the main conclusions drawn by Kahneman and Klein (2009) is that 
neither the heuristics and biases nor the naturalistic decision making approach can be 
claimed to provide “the” correct reading of intuitive expertise. Thus, a mix of the two, 
where applicable, might yield better results in the realm of political events forecasting, 
which is universally acknowledged to be a low-validity one, since, as already said, the 
quality of intuitive judgment depends on the level of predictability of the environment 
in the context of which the judgment is made.  
In fact, as already highlighted, whether the output is a score (in the case of the 
construction of PR indices) or a report (in the case of qualitative PR assessment) expert 
intuition entails managing to identify cause-effect mechanisms (on the notion of 
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causation see infra Chapter 2.6). If this is the case, then there are some intermediate 
objectives to be reached in the quest for “good” expert judgment, i.e. developing a 
shared language, structuring reasoning clearly and doing so in a transparent fashion so 
that it will be easier to trace the theoretical foundations (or lack thereof) of judgments 
made and consequently to scrutinize them. Structured techniques of intelligence 
analysis are generally deemed to be useful to achieve these objectives
53
. The US Central 
Intelligence Agency (2009) classifies them as a) Diagnostic techniques (such as key 
assumptions check, quality of information check, indicators or signposts of change, 
analysis of competing hypotheses); b) Contrarian techniques (such as devil’s advocacy, 
team a/team b, high-impact/low-probability analysis); and c) Imaginative thinking 
techniques (such as brainstorming, outside-in thinking, red team analysis, alternative 
futures analysis)
54
. Invaluable as the potential contributions of these techniques are in 
supporting the analyst in her forecasting endeavors, however, they share a major 
shortcoming: none of them addresses explicitly and systematically the core problem of 
political risk assessment, i.e. the identification of causal mechanisms. 
PR forecasts generally contain causal claims in one of two forms: either because, 
starting from a given event they aim at capturing its consequences (and in particular 
their ramifications concerning the activity of the investor) or because, as in premortem 
exercises (see previous section) they aim at retracing the causal chain of events leading 
to a given outcome.  
Gallo (2013) proposes an interesting approach to structured PR analysis, i.e. the 
so-called Explicit Causal Modeling (ECM). According to such approach, the PR 
assessment process relies on a “backbone” scheme providing structure to the arguments 
                                                          
53 See for instance Richards J.H (2009) Ch.4 and ff. 
54
 A detailed description of these structured intelligence analysis techniques falls beyond the scope of the 
present work. Suffice it to point out that they focus more on providing input in term of hypothesis 
formulation than on structuring the process of tracing causal mechanisms within each hypothesis. 
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set forth by PR experts. One distinctive advantage of this approach is that it makes it 
easier for the judge to check the causal claims she is making against the backdrop of 
existing theory. ECM allows for this both when it comes to devising a model for PR 
assessment (such as those described in Chapter 2-3 above) and when it comes to 
provide input to those models. It does so by evidencing the main causal links between 
explaining, intervening and outcome variables and by providing explicit information 
about the nature of those links, i.e. whether they are mediating”, “enabling”, 
“preventing”, “boosting”, etc. (Gallo 2013:17). 
If developed properly, ECM can provide crucial support in building (but also in 
testing) PR indices. For instance, recalling the points made in section 6 and ff. of 
Chapter 2 infra, and following the causal reasoning proposed by Jensen (2008) and 
positing that “democracies are associated with lower levels of political risk” in is 
possible to try and unpack and test the overarching explanatory variable by formulating 
specific hypotheses (see Figure 4.1). Drawing from the existing literature, the analyst 
could consider the existence of a democratic regime to be a factor that ceteris paribus 
decreases PR in a given country. If she unpacks the concept, she might be able to single 
out several hypotheses of specific causal mechanisms leading to the outcome. Looking 
at each of them individually, it is easier to test those hypotheses (for instance, the link 
between constraints over the executive and lower PR might be negatively influenced by 
intervenient variables such as the occurrence of a severe economic crisis that makes the 
perspective of expropriation more attractive for the country’s main executive in spite of 
the high level of constraints. The model presented is an extremely simplified one, while 
applying it to concrete cases might require to consider many, possibly interrelated 
intervenient variables). 
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Figure 4.1 Example of ECM applied to Political Risk Assessment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In a nutshell, structuring causal reasoning and making it explicit is crucial to any 
PR assessment endeavor. It is so both when the purpose is to design forecasting models 
and when it comes to produce “plug in” data for such models. It is also equally salient 
in qualitative PR analysis
55
. If we agree on the idea that PR analysis in general would 
greatly benefit from being grounded in theory, then we must also acknowledge that 
“learning to think causal” makes the task of checking causal claims against extant 
theories more likely to yield fruitful results.  
 
 
 
                                                          
55
 In this sense, qualitative PR analysis could greatly benefit from the booming stream of literature of  
“process tracing” in social sciences (see for instance Collier 2011) 
Overarching 
cause: Existence 
of a Democratic 
Regime  
Mechanism1 
(e.g.”constrai
nts on the 
executive) 
Mechanism 2  
(e.g. ‘policy 
transparency’) 
Mechanism 
3 (e.g. 
possibility of 
lobbying for 
the foreign 
investor) 
 
Effect: Lower 
Political Risk (?) 
Intervenient 
variable 
(e.g.”economic 
crisis”) 
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Conclusion 
 
To date, political risk analysis remains a practice-driven field of inquiry. To 
borrow the words of leading PR expert Llewellyn Howell, “Political risk analysis is a 
field replete with competition and demands as the world becomes an increasingly 
complex mosaic of political entities, cultures, tribes, racial configurations, and religions. 
Political risk analysis has been around as a field of study and a service to foreign 
investors for 50 years but we still don’t have consensus on what it actually is” (Howell 
2013).  The overarching objective of this work was to call for a reappraisal of PR 
conceptualization and measurement from an academic point of view, in an attempt to 
make sense of the complex world of PR analysis.  
The first chapter went through the vest plethora of alternative (sometimes even 
conflicting) meanings attached to the catch-all term “political risk”. In an attempt to 
shed some light on the under-explored question of PR meta-analysis, the second chapter 
proposed a comparison between five different PR indices by looking at their 
performance in forecasting the so-called “Arab Spring”. If such a performance was 
(indeed predictably!) mediocre (after all such a large-scale event was certainly difficult 
to predict), the meta-analysis conducted showed that the shortcomings of the existing 
approaches to PR assessment can be attributed at least partially to the way in which PR 
indices are built. Running counter to the “pragmatic turn” taking place in PR analysis 
during the last decades, throughout this work in has been argued that any choice 
regarding the dimensions to be incorporated in PR indices once the concept is 
operationalized is inevitably theory-laden. It has also been argued that borrowing from 
the existing theories can help the analyst avoid the conceptual loopholes of which the 
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complex task of forecasting social and political events is replete. In this sense, the third 
chapter tried to substantiate the claim that PR measuring exercises should take into 
account existing theories in the realm of political science and international relations, by 
proposing a gradual path for the construction of a PR index. In dealing with the long-
standing issue of expert judgment, the fourth chapter has elaborated on another 
leitmotiv of the whole work: that the concept of causation is core to a PR analysis at all 
levels. Thus, a crucial feature of true PR expertise is to be able to “think causal” when 
looking at the political environment for FDI. 
The main findings of this work can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Theory matters at all levels of PR analysis, even more so in light of the 
fact that today the field in question is still replete with instances of conceptual 
confusion; 
2. PR indices always contain causal claims that should be made explicit and 
open to scrutiny; 
3. As tracing causation mechanisms is the core challenge for PR analysis  a 
key dimension to PR expertise is developing formal methods for structuring 
causal reasoning; 
4. PR is not regime neutral: empirical evidence suggests that democracies 
are less risky than authoritarian regimes and that hybrid regimes configure a 
distinct risk category when it comes forecasting losses linked to war events. 
 
To conclude, some of the questions asked at the beginning of this work found an 
answer, yet much room is left for further inquiry in the realm of political risk analysis. 
More efforts are needed to bridge the hiatus between academia and practitioners. In 
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particular, future research should focus on two different streams of reasoning: as far as 
the methodological side is concerned, on devising structured techniques to enhance 
experts’ judgment, such as the explicit causal modelling ; as far as the substantial side is 
concerned, on the relationship between risk for FDI and the political regime of the host 
countries: the interaction between different research traditions (empirical political 
science vis-à-vis international economics) can yield extremely interesting results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
98 
 
Annex I - Political Risk Index Codebook 
 
Dimensions Indicators-
Sources 
Code Year Relation to risk 
Political Stability  
1.Human 
Development 
UNDP Human 
Development Index 
(0-100) 
hdi 2009 inverse 
2.Inequality* Gini Index- wb + cia 
factbook 
 gini 2000-09 direct 
3. Political 
Legitimacy  
Pol legitimacy score- 
Polity IV state 
Fragility Index (0-3) 
0=less fragile 3=more 
fragile 
legit 2009 direct 
4. Constraints to 
Responsiveness 
Central government 
debt, total/% GDP)- 
wdi 
 debt 2008 inverse 
Rule of Law  
1. Civil order Cingranelli & 
Richards physical 
integrity index (0-8) 
civ_ord 
 
2009 inverse 
2. Property rights Fraser Institute 2011 
economic Freedom 
data set 
prop_rights 
 
2009 inverse 
3. Administrative 
Capacity 
World Governance 
Indicators - World 
Bank 
adcap 2009 inverse 
4.Integrity Corruption 
Perceptions Index –
Transparemcy 
Inernational 
corrupt 2009 inverse 
5. Military 
interference 
Fraser Institute 2011 
economic Freedom 
data set 
mil 2009 direct 
6. Effective 
constraints on the 
executive 
Polity IV xconst xconst 2009 inverse 
7. International 
Dimension of the 
RoL 
ICSID- UNCTAD and 
World Governance 
Indicators 
bits 2010 inverse 
* “Inequality” should be incorporated into “Human Development”, but the recently introduced 
World Bank Inequality-adjusted HDI is only available for year 2011, therefore we opted for 
taking into account the Gini index as a separate sub-dimension 
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Annex II- The Economist Intelligence Unit Political Instability Index 
components 
 
Political Instability Index 
The overall index on a scale of 0 (no vulnerability) to 10 (highest vulnerability) has two 
component indices—an index of underlying vulnerability and an economic distress 
index. The overall index is a simple average of the two component indices. There are 15 
indicators in all—12 for the underlying and 3 for the economic distress index. 
I. Underlying vulnerability 
1. Inequality 
Measured by Gini coefficient 
0 if lower than 40 
1 if 40-50 
2 if higher than 50 
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators Economist Intelligence Unit 
estimates. 
2. State history 
Measured according to date of independence 
0 if before 1900 
1 if between 1900 and 1950 
2 if after 1950 
Source: CIA, Factbook. 
3. Corruption 
Economist Intelligence Unit ratings 
0 for low 
1 for moderate 
2 for high 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
4. Ethnic fragmentation 
Ethnic fractionalisation index (0 to 100 scale) 
0 if lower than 30 
1 if 30 to 50 
2 if higher than 50 
Source: Alesina Alberto et al, "Fractionalization", NBER Working Paper 9411, 2003. 
5. Trust in institutions 
Percentage of population that trusts/has confidence in parliament 
0 if more than 50% 
1 30-50% 
2 if less than 30% 
Sources: The Euro, Latino, Africa and Asia Barometer polls; World Values Survey. 
6. Status of minorities 
High rates of economic or political discrimination against minorities. Based on latest 
available assessment and scoring on 0 (no discrimination) to 4 (extreme discrimination) 
scale by Minorities at Risk Project (MRP). The MRP defines extreme discrimination 
(score of 4) if any minority group is subject to public policies that constitute formal 
exclusion and/or recurring repression, and that substantially restrict the groups' 
economic opportunities or political participation. There is significant discrimination 
(score of 3) if minority group suffers from significant poverty and under-representation 
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owing to prevailing social practices by dominant group. 
0 if low or no discrimination (MRP scores lower than 3) 
1 if significant discrimination (if score of 3 by for any minority by MRP) 
2 if extreme discrimination (if score of 4 for any minority by MRP) 
7. History of political instability 
Significant episodes or events of political instability (regime change) as recorded by 
Political Instability Task Force (PITF) 
0 if no recorded episode 
1 if one major episode 
2 if two or more episodes 
Source: PITF database. 
8. Proclivity to labour unrest 
Risk of labour unrest 
0 if low 
1 if moderate 
2 if high 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Risk Briefing. 
9. Level of social provision 
Measured on the basis of the "expected" infant mortality rate; based on residuals from a 
regression of the natural logarithm of the infant mortality rate on the logarithm of GPP 
per head US$ at purchasing power parity (PPP) for 2006. 
0 if the actual infant mortality rate is lower than predicted, or if the actual rate does not 
exceed the predicted rate by a significant margin 
1 if ratio between actual and predicted infant mortality rate is greater than 1.1 but less 
than 1.5 
2 if ratio between actual and predicted infant mortality rate is greater than 1.5 
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit; World Bank, World Development Indicators 
10. A country's neighbourhood 
Based on the average vulnerability index (calculated on the basis of all indicators except 
the neighbourhood indicator) for all of the country's geographic neighbours. 
0 if index is less than 5.8 
1 if index is 5.8 to 6.3 
2 if index is higher than 6.3 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
11. Regime type 
Based on classification of political regimes, according to the Economist Intelligence 
Unit's Index of Democracy 
0 if either a full democracy or authoritarian regime 
2 if either a non-consolidated, "flawed" democracy or a hybrid regime (neither a 
democracy nor an autocracy) 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
12. Regime type and factionalism 
The interaction of regime type with the existence of political factionalism (according to 
Polity IV database). According to Polity, factionalism is defined as polities with 
parochial (possibly, but not necessarily, ethnic-based) political factions that regularly 
compete for political influence to promote particularist agendas and favour heavily 
group members to the detriment of a common agenda. 
4 if a country is both an intermediate regime and suffers from factionalism 
0 if not 
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II. Economic distress 
1. Growth in incomes 
Growth in real GDP per head in 2009 
0 if forecast growth in real GDP per head is positive, with minimal risks that it could be 
negative 
1 if a fall in GDP per head is forecast or there is a significant risk of that occurring, but 
the decline is less than by 4% 
2 if a forecast decline in GDP per head is greater than by 4% or there is a significant risk 
that this could occur 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
2. Unemployment 
Unemployment rate, %. 
0 if forecast unemployment rate is less than 6% and there are only minimal risks that it 
could be higher than 6% 
1 if a forecast unemployment rate is higher than 6% or there is a significant risk of that 
occurring, but the rate does not surpass 10% 
2 if a forecast unemployment rate is higher than 10% or there is a significant risk that 
this could occur 
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit; International Labour Organisation. 
3. Level of income per head 
Measured by GDP per head at PPP, US$ in 2007, on the assumption that richer countries 
can more easily withstand economic distress 
0 if more than US$12,000 
1 if between US$3,000 and US$12,000 
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Annex III - The EIU Political Instability Index ranking 2009-2010 
 
# Country EIU score # Country EIU score 
1 Ukraine 7,6 33 Azerbaijan 5,2 
2 Bosnia and Hercegovina 7,5 34 Italy 5 
3 Moldova 7,5 35 Belarus 4,8 
4 Turkey 6,8 36 Portugal 4,8 
5 Estonia 6,7 37 Ireland 4,6 
6 Latvia 6,7 38 Tunisia 4,6 
7 Algeria 6,6 39 United Kingdom 4,6 
8 Macedonia 6,6 40 Poland 4,5 
9 Russia 6,5 41 Cyprus 4,1 
10 Montenegro 6,4 42 Qatar 4,1 
11 Romania 6,4 43 United Arab Emirates 4,1 
12 Serbia 6,4 44 Belgium 4 
13 Georgia 6,3 45 Netherlands 4 
14 Greece 6,3 46 Oman 3,9 
15 Albania 6,2 47 Germany 3,8 
16 Iran 6,2 48 Slovenia 3,8 
17 Croatia 6,1 49 Czech Republic 3,7 
18 Hungary 6,1 50 Austria 3,6 
19 Lithuania 6,1 51 Switzerland 3,4 
20 Yemen 6,1 52 Finland 3,2 
21 Bulgaria 6 53 Sweden 3,2 
22 Armenia 5,8 54 Denmark 2,2 
23 Syria 5,8 55 Norway 1,2 
24 Morocco 5,6 51 Switzerland 3,4 
25 Bahrain 5,5 52 Finland 3,2 
26 Israel 5,5 53 Sweden 3,2 
27 Kuwait 5,5 54 Denmark 2,2 
28 Slovakia 5,5 55 Norway 1,2 
29 Spain 5,5 52 Finland 3,2 
30 Egypt 5,4 53 Sweden 3,2 
31 Jordan 5,4 54 Denmark 2,2 
32 France 5,3 55 Norway 1,2 
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Annex IV - Political Stability in the in Authoritarian Regimes : Lessons 
from the Arab Uprisings56 
 
Abstract 
 
History abounds with instances in which Western countries have pursued policies 
supporting authoritarian regimes, while lukewarmly investing in democracy 
promotion. The EU and US’s attitude vis-à-vis the Middle-East and Northern Africa 
(MENA) region has followed this pattern. By looking at political discourse and practice, 
this paper explores the conceptual loopholes into which Western policy-makers have 
often fallen when choosing stability over democracy in the southern Mediterranean 
region. The paper focuses on US and EU attitude towards MENA countries before and 
after the start of the Arab Spring with the goal of reappraising mainstream approaches 
to political stability amongst both governmental and non-governmental actors. 
 
Keywords: Political stability/ Arab spring / Democracy promotion/ European Union/ 
United States 
 
1. Political stability: a multifaceted concept 
Few today would question that the Arab Spring represents a critical juncture in the 
history of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Equally irrefutable is the fact that 
the Arab Spring is leading to a policy re-adjustment by both the United States (US) and 
the European Union (EU). Opinions on how this re-adjustment will unfold abound, but 
one fact is incontrovertible: political turmoil in the MENA was largely unexpected.  
Admittedly, predicting abrupt political change is always a difficult task, strongly 
influenced by the way in which analysts and policy-makers conceptualize and assess 
political stability. 57 Both the US and the EU – each in its own way – have pursued their 
policies in the Arab world and elsewhere on the basis of specific beliefs about the 
                                                          
56
 Paper published in the series  IAI WORKING PAPERS 13 | 01 – January 2013 - ISSN 2280-
4331 
57
F. Gregory Gause III , “Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring”, in Foreign Affairs, Vol.90, No. 
4 (July/August 2011), pp.81-90 
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elements underpinning the stability of non-democratic regimes. Much as their policies, 
the beliefs on which those policies were based also seem to be in need of an upgrade.  
Stability is desirable for a vast array of reasons, particularly because it provides 
external players with the advantage of dealing with a government whose actions are 
predictable (at least to some extent). From the vantage point of the policy-maker, 
dealing with a failed or failing state is a daunting scenario, in which it is difficult to 
identify a counterpart to interact with and where the uncertainty ascribable to state 
weakness is maximized. It comes as no surprise, then, that several governments make 
a constant effort at getting as accurate an understanding as possible of the risks 
threatening the stability of third states.58  
Yet, these efforts do not always produce the desired results. The problems linked to 
the risk management of instability are well exemplified by Western policies towards 
the MENA region, historically an extremely sensitive area for geopolitical as well as 
economic reasons. Before and after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, the Western 
world sought a close partnership with supposedly moderate Arab governments to keep 
political Islam (considered to pursue an agenda hardly compatible with Western views) 
at bay, contain tensions between Arab states and Israel, secure energy supplies, and 
fight Islam-rooted terrorism. In this context, Western policies in the MENA region have 
largely rested on a specific idea of political stability which, in the wake of the Arab 
Spring, it is time to unpack. In so doing, we might get a better understanding of what 
was missed, and what changes or integrations might help avoid strategic surprises in 
the future. 
If one looks at the various and diverse definitions of ‘political stability’, it is 
immediately evident that the concept is rather controversial.59 A first, broad definition 
refers to the absence of domestic civil conflict and widespread violence. In this sense, a 
country can be considered rid of instability when no systematic attacks on persons or 
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property take place within its boundaries. Such definition is problematic, since the 
political situation of a certain country can look stable in a given moment (meaning that 
no systematic attacks on persons or property are taking place) notwithstanding the 
fact that the regime may be very fragile. A classic example in this sense is US President 
Jimmy Carter’s praising of pre-revolutionary Iran for being “an island of stability in one 
of the more troubled areas of the world.”60 while spending New Year's Eve in 1977 
with the Shah. At that time few would have imagined what happened in that country 
less than two years later. 
Another classic interpretation equates stability with government longevity. A serious 
problem with this definition is that a country experiencing frequent changes of 
government is considered unstable, even when continuity in governmental policies is 
maintained by a relatively stable administrative system in which institutional norms 
are well embedded. According to this criterion, Italy, which experienced more than 
sixty changes of government in its sixty-year-old republican history, and Belgium, with 
its unenviable record of 541 days without a cabinet, in 2010 should have both been 
ranked as less stable than Egypt, which featured over thirty years of uninterrupted rule 
by President Hosni Mubarak. 
Another approach to political stability draws on the lack of structural change, that is, 
the absence of internally or externally induced change in the basic configuration of a 
polity. This notion is somewhat problematic in its ramifications, first of all because 
defining ‘structural change’ is difficult in itself, but also because deep changes are 
possible in polities that nonetheless retain strong elements of continuity in their 
constitutional, economic and social configurations. 
Most recently, scholars and practitioners seem to have come to terms with the fact 
that political stability is a multifaceted reality, depending on different determinants, 
structural as well as contingent ones, ranging from institutional arrangements to the 
international predicament of a given country. The international consulting firm Eurasia 
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Group, for instance, defines political stability as the capacity of a country's political 
system to withstand internal or external shocks.  
In this sense, a broad operational definition of political stability should take concepts 
and indicators into account such as human development (as measured by the UN 
Human Development Index); inequality (Gini index); political legitimacy (i.e. the more 
or less widespread support for the government, be it democratic or non-democratic); 
constraints on regime responsiveness (i.e. the economic constraints that governments 
encounter in meeting the requests of their citizens as expressed, for instance, by the 
total stock of a country's public debt);61 and regional/international integration 
(meaning, for instance, membership in international and regional organizations or the 
ratio of total foreign trade over GDP).  
Such dimensions and the respective indicators can all be used as analytical tools to 
reach a clearer understanding of what makes a country more stable than another. For 
instance, if one looks at the constraints to regime responsiveness as negatively 
correlated to political stability, it can be argued that one of the reasons behind the 
Algerian regime's resilience is that the country's financial situation has allowed the 
government to immediately respond to the economic grievances of the people 
through measures such as increasing subsidies for staples.62 
Drawing from the distinctions outlined above, it seems reasonable to hold that up until 
recently the predominant focus in the Western world (both governmental and non-
governmental) was on stability as regime longevity, which was considered as a crucial 
premise for the ability to pursue Western strategic priorities (from security to the fight 
against terrorism and illegal migration). This approach, however, was underpinned by 
assumptions that history proved to be debatable at the very least. 
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2. The US and the EU: different narratives, similar pro-stability policies 
In spite of some differences in their approaches, both the US and the EU equated 
political stability in the MENA region with regime survival. Pre-2011 Arab regimes 
typically tried to avoid political reform while consolidating state apparatuses (military, 
security forces, civilian bureaucracies), which served the double purpose of extending 
state control over society and at the same time creating state-subsidized jobs to fight 
unemployment, a major source of social unrest.63 Youth unemployment, in particular, 
has been widely recognized as a direct cause of social unrest. For instance, in 2010 
Egypt’s youth unemployment reached the high rate of 23.4% of the workforce.64 
Entrenched in their view of political stability as essentially resulting from regime 
longevity, Americans and Europeans alike were unable and unwilling to devise 
consistent democracy promotion initiatives which would have imperilled precisely 
regime longevity.  
US democracy promotion in the MENA region was channelled through USAID (the 
federal foreign aid agency), the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), and the State 
Department’s Human Rights and Democracy Initiative (HRDF). As for the EU, on top of 
several initiatives by individual member states, it is worth mentioning the European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Yet, both the US 
and the EU consciously subordinated their efforts at democracy promotion to the 
overarching goal of keeping Arab countries in line with Western policy objectives. As 
the region’s authoritarian regimes generally managed to persuade their Western 
partners that policy alignment could only be sustained if they remained in power, a 
short-circuit ensued between Western stability-promotion and democracy-promotion, 
with the latter generally being sidelined for the sake of the former. 
This was reflected, among other things, in the prevalent attitude by Western actors 
within international fora such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
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Bank (WB). The IMF and the WB lending activity is based on the principle of 
conditionality: the concession of loans is conditional to the implementation of reforms 
such as restricting budget deficits or decreasing government subsidies, which are likely 
to cause discontent among the population of beneficiary countries. The economic 
burden imposed on several Arab regimes by the WB and the IMF's reform agendas was 
in some cases eased thanks to Western intervention, which resulted in enhanced 
government stability, while at the same time reducing space for economic reform.  
In line with the West’s pro-stability attitude, in the last decades the World Bank has 
actually recorded a general decline in “governance conditionality”, i.e. conditionality 
seeking to promote political reform in the recipient countries.65 As far as the IMF is 
concerned, the US sometimes exerted its influence in order to encourage the 
alignment of loan-recipient countries with its policy objectives. This happened when 
IMF conditionality could jeopardize the stability of friendly regimes,66 as in the case of two 
IMF-Egypt agreements in 1987 and 1991. The US State Department and US Executive 
Director at the IMF intervened at the time in the negotiation over both agreements to 
make sure that Egypt could receive a lenient agreement, for fear of triggering political 
instability.67  
Relations of EU countries with the Southern Mediterranean regimes followed a similar 
pattern. Although the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership subordinated economic 
cooperation to political reform benchmarks, application of this conditionality-based 
approach was quite lenient. Several European countries cultivated close ties with 
Northern African regimes, as in the case of the amitié particulière between former 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy and his Tunisian counterpart Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, 
which at the onset of the uprising in Tunisia turned into a source of embarrassment for 
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the French government,68 or the close relationship (particularly on tackling irregular 
immigration) between Italy and Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's Libya, enhanced by the 
historical 2008 Italian-Libyan Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation.69 
The need for reliable and cooperative counterparts in the Middle East became more 
urgent than ever in the wake of 9/11, which turned pro-Western Arab autocrats into 
valuable allies in the fight against Islam-rooted terrorism. Heavy-handed autocrats 
such as Mubarak in Egypt or Ben Ali in Tunisia were perceived as the only viable 
alternative to unstable governments prone to take-overs by hostile Islamic forces. By 
contrast, a growing consensus emerged in both the US and the EU that non-violent 
Islamist forces should somehow be engaged, as these forces generally had significant 
popular support. Due to the severe constraints imposed by the imperative of fighting 
terrorism, however, engagement of Islamist groups and parties was limited to low-
profile exchanges between experts and mid-level practitioners.  
Arab autocrats were wary even of these limited exchanges, and more often than not 
paid just lip-service to Western requests that non-violent Islamist forces be allowed 
greater leeway. Thus, in the West the debate over the relationship between political 
Islam and democracy ended up being limited to whether or to what extent Islamist 
forces should be allowed into electoral competition.70  
Such dilemma is well exemplified by the events linked to the presidential and 
legislative elections held in Egypt in September and November 2005, respectively, after 
a change of attitude by the US towards political liberalization epitomized by the 
famous speech delivered in Cairo in June 2005 by Condoleezza Rice, then US Secretary 
of State. Rice called for freedom and democracy in MENA countries, and explicitly 
admitted that for sixty years the US had “pursued stability at the expense of 
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democracy in the Middle East – and achieved neither”.71 Years later, Rice’s words were 
echoed by President Barack Obama in his 2009 Cairo address,72 as well as by Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton at the Forum for the Future in Doha in late 2010.73  
As a result of combined US and internal pressures, in 2005 Egyptian President Mubarak 
proposed to amend the Constitution to allow for Egypt’s first ever multicandidate 
presidential election74 and relaxed police pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood, which 
in the following legislative elections won 40 percent of the vote, which meant a 
fivefold increase in the numbers of seats in the parliament (they won 20 percent of the 
total seats).75 The Egyptian regime reacted by taking stiff anti-reform measures, such 
as postponing local elections and launching arrest campaigns against Muslim 
Brotherhood affiliates.76 In spite of its pro-democracy rhetoric, the US turned a blind 
eye on such measures, clearly demonstrating the prioritization of regime stability over 
democratic openings. 
Such a policy choice was underpinned by a quite widespread belief about the 
capability of Arab regimes to cling to power at least in the medium term and, possibly, 
to democratize gradually over time. Such belief seemed to be reflected, for instance, in 
the fact that US democracy assistance towards MENA countries never lost over time its 
top-down approach, i.e., an approach focusing on reform of state institutions rather 
than on the support for civil society.77  
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The same can be said about European democracy assistance.78 The EU outlined the 
objective of ensuring a secure and stable neighbourhood when it launched the 
European Neighbourhood Policy. In the ENP framework, the EU declared its will to 
address the causes of “political instability, economic vulnerability, institutional 
deficiencies, conflict and poverty and social exclusion”79 in neighbouring countries. 
However, the EU rarely made use of the instruments at its disposal to sanction its 
neighbourhood’s democratic shortcomings.80 As in the case of 2005 Egypt, where very 
limited reforms related to judicial independence and press freedom were enacted only 
to deflect criticism and consolidate state control,81 democratic reforms in the EU’s 
Arab partners were generally cosmetic rather than substantial in nature. While flows 
of trade and investment between the EU and Mediterranean countries experienced 
constant growth, with European foreign direct investment reaching a peak of 15 billion 
euros in 2006,82 the trend in civil liberties and political rights was, according to 
Freedom House data, static and in some cases negative (Tunisia, for instance, which 
had been labelled as “partially free” in 2002, switched to “not free” in 2008).83 
Despite being often referred to as a “normative power”,84 the EU was even less vocal 
than the US in calling for democracy in the MENA region.  
The US and EU policies in favour of political stability across the Mediterranean prior to 
late 2010 appeared to have hinged on the aforementioned conviction that stability 
could (and perhaps, pragmatically should) be equated with regime survival, as well as 
the belief that an authoritarian regime could be as durable as a democratic one, at 
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least in the short-medium term, and the idea that a gradual (rather than an abrupt) 
democratic transition to democracy was possible and desirable in the Arab world. Until 
the outbreak of protests in December 2010, it was generally thought that hereditary 
successions would possibly take place in Egypt, Libya and Yemen.85 
Given these premises, in Western eyes the relationship between democratization and 
stability could not but manifest itself as a trade-off, exposing the inescapable tension 
embedded in the Western policies towards the region, between the “desire of 
democracy and the need for stability”.86 
 
3. Explaining Western preference for stability over democracy: political stability 
assessment   
National intelligence agencies as well as think tanks and other non-governmental 
actors (such as multinational enterprises, banks, consulting firms) regularly perform 
political stability analysis (as part of country risk analyses) through a number of 
different techniques and indicators.87 This notwithstanding, most observers were 
caught unprepared by the outburst of political protest in Tunisia, and even more so by 
the events that followed across the entire MENA region. Why?  
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to concentrate on whether the 
instruments to assess political stability on which Western governments tend to rely are 
premised on acceptable conceptual assumptions, or whether instead the ‘original sin’ 
of Western pro-stability policies – in the MENA but also elsewhere – lies with the way 
political stability is conceptually framed and empirically assessed. 
Up to 2010, governments, business and other non-governmental analysts generally 
focused on some aspects of the general situation of a given country at the expense of 
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others, which instead proved to be crucial in explaining what happened in the MENA 
countries starting from late December 2010.  
As argued above, the Western understanding of political stability across the 
Mediterranean prior to late 2010 hinged on the assumptions that authoritarian 
regimes were stable and that gradual democratic transition in the Arab world was 
possible. Such assumptions, embedded in the mainstream discourse, had relevant 
consequences when it came to performing the assessment task. Among the several 
indices providing country risk ratings, few, if any, considered in 2010 the variable 
“political regime” to be a possible predictor of instability. Business Environment Risk 
Intelligence (BERI), a US-based consultancy, for instance, did not take into account the 
type of political regime in its political risk index, which is meant to measure overall 
political stability.88 Interestingly, in some cases authoritarianism was considered to be 
an element actually enhancing stability rather than the other way round. This is the 
case of the “Political Instability Index” by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), the risk 
consultancy of The Economist group, which claims to identify and quantify the main 
social, economic and political factors that are causally associated with political 
instability. The model factors in variables deemed to be correlated with political 
instability, namely the level of development as measured by the infant mortality rate; 
extreme cases of economic or political discrimination against minorities; the degree of 
political stability of neighbouring countries; ethnic fragmentation; poor governance; a 
proclivity to labour unrest; the level of provision of public services and state strength, 
as well as indicators accounting for economic distress.89 When assessing the political 
regime component, the EIU adopts a coding scheme based on a classification of 
political regimes according to its own Index of Democracy: “0 [is assigned to] either a 
full democracy or authoritarian regime; 2 [is assigned to] either a non-consolidated, 
‘flawed’ democracy or a hybrid regime (neither a democracy nor an autocracy)”.  
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By attributing less stability to the so-called hybrid regimes90 compared with both full 
democracies and autocracies, the EIU methodology relies on some recent 
developments in scholarly studies on the relationship between political regimes and 
stability.91 However, although the proposition that hybrid regimes are the most 
vulnerable seems to be supported by empirical evidence, the relative behaviour of full 
autocracies or full democracies has not been subject to specific studies. Thus, when it 
comes to assessing the stability of democratic vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes, the EIU – 
and many others with it – deems a full democracy and a full autocracy to be equally 
stable in the short-to medium term. Such a choice, although based on a quite diffused 
belief about the resilience of authoritarian regimes, seems to have proven flawed in 
light of the Arab Spring. 
While it is certainly true that the relatively small institutional adjustments that take 
place frequently in democratic contexts are much less likely to occur in authoritarian 
ones, change in the latter, when it occurs, can be on a much larger scale. This is 
certainly a major lesson taught by the Arab uprisings, namely that democracy and 
autocracy cannot be equated when evaluating the degree of political stability of a given 
country. This equation derives from an oversimplification of reality, lacking a sound 
empirical foundation and inevitably leading to misjudgements in cross-country 
comparisons. According to the EIU methodology, for instance, Italy in 2010 scored 
more than Tunisia in terms of vulnerability to political and social unrest.  
An important warning, then, is that a strategic shift of attention is needed from a short-
sighted notion of stability as regime survival to the mid- to -long-term sustainability of 
political regimes92. The structural factors that can make autocracies frail are still longing 
for an in-depth investigation. The once widely held opinion that democracies are more 
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prone to instability, in particular, seems to have lost ground when confronted with 
empirical data about the resilience of autocratic regimes.93  
As for sustainability assessment, an interesting starting point would be the empirical 
analysis of regime responsiveness, that is, the extent to which governments enact 
policies that correspond to the expectations of citizens and civil society.94 In this 
perspective, all issues related to political legitimacy and representation, far from being 
a purely normative concern, come to the fore as crucially relevant also for stability 
assessment exercises. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The Arab Spring has proven that Western expectations concerning the supposed 
stability of autocratic regimes relied on flawed assessment mechanisms. In particular, 
the notion of stability as regime survival has turned out to be too simplistic, in that it 
has been incapable of shedding light on the determinants of long-term political 
stability. Authoritarian transition, which occurred in several cases in the past decades, 
was thought to be a viable and likely scenario in countries like Egypt, Libya and Yemen. 
The Arab Spring is clearly forcing the international community as well as the academy 
to focus on the question of relative stability of autocracies and democracies, a question 
which will also be crucial to the future of Western democracy assistance or promotion 
policies. A crucial field to be explored in this regard concerns regime sustainability. The 
need to conceive of the nexus between democracy and stability as a mutually 
reinforcing relationship instead of a trade-off is not merely a matter of normative 
concern. Rather, it is an issue relevant to the strategic assessment of a given country’s 
political stability, and Western policy-makers as well as intelligence agencies would 
certainly benefit from a change of perspective in this regard. 
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